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ARTICLES
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONTROL OF UNION DISCIPLINE AND
THE MYTH OF NONINTERVENTION
Roger C. Hartley*
INTRODUCTION
No brighter star shines in the firmament of national labor pol-
icy rhetoric than the promise to American workers of their right to
designate union "representatives of their own choosing."' The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), recognizing this much her-
alded autonomy, professes a fierce commitment not to obstruct
union members' right to choose their own leaders2 and otherwise
oversee internal governance.3 Although the NLRB has publicly em-
* Copyright 1991, Roger C. Hartley. All rights reserved.
Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America; B.S.
1965, Cornell University; J.D. 1970, University of Pittsburgh; LL.M. 1972, George Washing-
ton University.
1. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The
complete text of the Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988).
2. See General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969) (employees enjoy a
fundamental right to choose their representatives for bargaining, absent a clear and present
danger to the collective bargaining process); accord Kudla v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1987); Louisiana Council 17, AFSCME, 250 N.L.R.B. 880, 882 n.17 (1980). See also Team-
sters Local 703, 284 N.L.R.B. 1125 (1987) (union will not be decertified or ordered not to
designate two persons as bargaining representatives due to their previously violent behav-
ior). But cf. Fitzsimons Mfg. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 375 (1980), enforced sub nom. UAW v.
NLRB, 670 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1982) (employer not required to bargain with two union rep-
resentatives who previously had acted violently at bargaining sessions).
3. Litigation under the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act made it plain that Con-
gress did not authorize the NLRB to regulate union enforcement of membership obligations.
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949). See infra notes 24-26 and accom-
panying text.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act is replete
with guarantees that section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act would not be used to regu-
late the internal affairs of unions. See infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly voices the proscriptions against NLRB
involvement in internal union affairs. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. The
NLRB, from its earliest cases, readily concedes that Congress requires that it abstain from
regulating union internal affairs. See Sheet Metal Workers' Local 22, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 150,
6, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (Oct. 5, 1989) ("[t]he Board and [the] courts have long
recognized that Congress in enacting [slection 8(b)(1) did not intend to regulate the internal
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braced a policy of nonintervention, an examination of its activities
demonstrates that it has become a major regulator of internal
union government. For example, the NLRB limits the membership
majority's autonomy to determine eligibility to vote in internal
union elections and hold union office,4 it monitors the union officer
election campaign,5 and it constricts members' ability to compel
union leaders to conform to the will of their constituencies.6
This article explains how the NLRB, contrary to its protesta-
tions of noninterference with internal union affairs, has perfected
its grip on union self-governance through control of the union dis-
ciplinary processes. The disparity between the Board's policies and
its actions discredits the Board's proclaimed abstention.
Second, this article examines whether the NLRB overreaches
its regulatory authority through its intervention in the officer selec-
tion and discipline processes. NLRB regulation of union discipline
rests primarily on section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Labor Management Re-
affairs of unions. ); Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160
(1978).
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (§§ 401-531 (1988)) au-
thorizes limited federal regulation of internal union government. The NLRB, however, has
no explicit enforcement role in this scheme. But see infra notes 178-283 and accompanying
text.
4. See infra notes 91-177 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 178-283 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 139-177 and accompanying text.
7. Although the NLRB involves itself in union activity in many ways, the focus of this
article is NLRB intervention through its control of union discipline. The Board controls
union membership resignation procedures. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Local 18, 298
N.L.R.B. No. 11, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1043 (Mar. 30, 1990). The Board determines the
portion of dues a union may charge to union dues objectors and oversees procedures for
providing dues objectors advanced dues reductions. See Communications Workers v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735 (1988). The Board monitors union decisions regarding merger and affiliation.
See NLRB v. Financial Instit. Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986); May Dept.
Stores, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299 (June 30, 1988), enforced, 133
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2745 (Feb. 28, 1990). The Board can influence a member's willingness to
serve as a union leader by permitting selective employer discipline of union officers, see, e.g.,
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), and by approving or disapproving
some of the perquisites of union office such as superseniority, see, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1131,
UAW, 777 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1985), or negotiated leaves of absence from regular employ-
ment while holding union office, see, e.g., IBEW Local 1212, 288 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 128
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1219 (Apr. 1, 1988). The Board even determines who may hold union office
by allocating rights of supervisors to participate in the internal union political process. Com-
pare ESI, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1323 (Oct. 16, 1989) (unlawful to
appoint supervisor to the joint apprenticeship and training committee) and Hoyt, Brumm &
Link, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1225 (Feb. 14, 1989) (lawful to per-
mit general foreman to be delegate to union convention and member of union finance
committee).
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lations (Taft-Hartley) Act.8 The Board's early decisions under this
section, as well as judicial precedent, defined a narrower role for
NLRB intervention than the role presently claimed by the Board.
Courts increasingly are rejecting the NLRB's assertion of broad
regulatory authority. 10 The Supreme Court's union discipline cases,
decided over a decade ago, initiated these judicial misgivings.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Pattern
Makers' League v. NLRB n and Communication Workers v. Beck1
2
require a reappraisal of expansive NLRB monitoring of internal
union life. Pattern Makers' and Beck ring in a new era of volun-
tary unionism that demands acknowledgement.
Finally, this article addresses the various conflicting interests
that underlie and oppose NLRB intervention in internal union af-
fairs. The Board's decisions rarely discuss their practical impact on
unions or their contribution to the national policy aspirations that
unions be governed democratically and independently. I s The desir-
ability of Board intervention, however, should be assessed by con-
sidering all of the legitimate conflicting interests raised: the indi-
vidual rights at risk, the union majority's collective associational
interests, and the wider public interest in union democratic self-
government with minimal governmental interference."
As recently as 1973, the Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court stated, "It is odd, to say the least, to find a union
urging on us severe limitations on NLRB authority [because the
8. Section 8(b)(1)(A), as codified, provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7]: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein ....
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1988).
9. See infra notes 22, 27-46, 63-75 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 81-89, 114-115, 207-219, 260-266 and accompanying text.
11. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 105 (1985) (union prohibition on a
member's right to resign violative of section 8(b)(1)(A) and contrary to congressional "policy
of voluntary unionism").
12. Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (violation of the duty of fair
representation for the union to enforce a union security clause against a nonmember em-
ployee by requiring nonmember employee to pay for union services not germane to collec-
tive bargaining).
13. See infra notes 158-177 and accompanying text.
14. See id.
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NLRB lacks the requisite expertise]."'" However, in light of in-
creasing NLRB control over the union disciplinary process, re-
quests to limit NLRB authority seem less odd today. The NLRB
has exceeded its authority by intervening in internal union affairs
and it is time to reevaluate the appropriate limits on NLRB
authority.
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF SECTION 8(b)(1)(A)
The United States has many laws regulating the selection of
union officers. Title IV of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) explicitly regulates union officer
elections.1 In addition, union members may initiate litigation di-
rectly under Title I of the LMRDA to challenge abuses of the of-
ficer selection process. 17 Title I also regulates the discipline of
union members, including union officers, with regard to their intra-
union political activities."5 The NLRB has become an additional
regulator of the internal union political process through its super-
vision of union discipline.
A union employs discipline to achieve various objectives. A
monetary fine may be intended to punish or deter future breaches
of obligations of union membership. A fine, however, carries no
statement from the group that the individual recipient lacks con-
tinued worthiness to participate in union governance. When, how-
ever, a member is expelled or suspended from membership, barred
from eligibility to be a candidate for union office, or precluded
from attending union meetings for a set period, the union collec-
tive sends a different message. The union may deter and punish,
but it also excludes the disciplined member from participation in
the internal union political process.
Appreciation of the NLRB's role as intervenor in internal
union political processes begins with an understanding that the
Board's control over union member expulsion shifts the locus of
15. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 78 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-84 (1988). Title IV of the LMRDA directs the Department of La-
bor to oversee the conduct of union elections, with recourse to the federal courts for enforce-
ment of its orders. See M. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 205-97 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Local No. 82, Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526 (1984)
(Title I of LMRDA available to protect member participation in union election process if
the election has not been conducted already and the relief sought does not require invalida-
tion of election). See generally M. MALIN, supra note 16 at 50-81.
18. See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text.
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authority outside the union because the NLRB determines leader-
ship eligibility within the union.19 NLRB authority to regulate
union discipline derives from section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act. Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits union restraint or coercion of
an employee's right to engage in or refrain from concerted activity
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection. Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides, however, that the section shall
not be interpreted to "impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership [in the union]. 20 Section 8(b)(1)(A) seems to state
unequivocally that the Board may not proscribe union member ex-
pulsion. Moreover, the Board may not bar the imposition of lesser
forms of discipline that only affect one's "retention of member-
ship," such as temporary suspension or ineligibility to be a candi-
date for office or to attend union meetings. Nevertheless, the
NLRB now routinely bans union discipline that affects only mem-
bership rights.2
A. The Original Interpretation
The NLRB's expansionist tendencies began prior to the 1947
enactment of section 8(b)(1)(A). In 1942, without section
8(b)(1)(A) to regulate internal affairs of unions, the NLRB devel-
oped the Rutland Court doctrine.22 This doctrine provided that an
employer may not lawfully discharge employees pursuant to a
closed shop contract when the employer knows that the discharge
is requested by the union for the purpose of preventing employees
from seeking to change their bargaining representative.2
19. Political autonomy is largely defined by the locus of effective authority to set eligi-
bility standards for the acquisition and retention of the right to participate in the process of
democratic self-government. This is well-recognized in American political life where, for ex-
ample, autonomy from the federal government includes the right of each state to "establish
its own form of government and .limit the right to govern to those who are full-fledged mem-
bers of the political community." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984) (describing the
State's right to exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic
self-government).
20. See supra note 8.
21. Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 846-47 (1966) ("We are unable to con-
clude that a reasonable reading of the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) permits a valid distinc-
tion to be drawn between fines and expulsions .... [F]ines and expulsions are to receive
equal treatment under the [Act]."), enforced, 396 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1968). See infra notes
103-119 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
22. Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942).
23. In a closed shop agreement the continued employment of an employee is condi-
tional on the employee maintaining membership in good standing in the union. H. ROBERTS,
1991]
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The Rutland Court doctrine was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB.2' In that case, the
union expelled dissidents for dual unionism and obtained their dis-
charge under a closed shop agreement with the employer. Applying
the Rutland Court doctrine, the Board found that the employer
had violated the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act and re-
quired that the discharged employees be restored to their former
jobs with no loss of pay or seniority.2 5 The Supreme Court re-
versed. At the time of the union's conduct, the Court reasoned,
congressional policy permitted the closed shop. The NLRB's Rut-
land Court doctrine was viewed as an NLRB attempt to defeat
that policy by
ignor[ing] the plain provisions of a valid contract made in ac-
cordance with the letter and the spirit of the statute and re-
form it to conform to the Board's idea of correct policy. Shorn
of embellishment, the Board's policy makes interference and




Enforcing union membership obligations by adversely affect-
ing union members' employment rights is poor labor policy.2 7 Col-
gate-Palmolive-Peet Co. made the point in 1946 that "[t]o sustain
the Board's contention would be to permit the Board under the
guise of administration to . . . [practice] administrative amend-
ment of the statute."2  The appropriate present inquiry is whether
the Board has heeded the Court's admonition by finding a wide-
ranging license in section 8(b)(1)(A) to restrict the union's internal
enforcement of membership obligations.
The present interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A) began to
ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 105 (1986).
24. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
25. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1946), enforced, 171 F.2d 956 (1949),
rev'd, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
26. Id. at 363. Congress expressly rejected such an expansionist vision of government
regulation prior to 1947. See id. at 363 n.16, 364.
27. The Taft-Hartley Act remedied this abuse, as the Supreme Court made clear in
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB: "The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from
their organizational rights. [The Act was] designed to allow employees to freely exercise
their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any
union without imperiling their livelihood." Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40
(1954); accord NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). The only limitation on
the policy discussed in Radio Officers' is the union's right to require the payment of union
dues and fees pursuant to a lawful union security agreement. Id. at 742.
28. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 363-64 (1949).
[Vol. 16:11
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evolve in 1948 when the NLRB decided National Maritime
Union.2 9 The issue raised was whether a union's attempt, through
collective bargaining, to obtain an unlawful closed shop agreement
violated section 8(b)(1)(A). In another case discussing National
Maritime, the Board examined the section's legislative history and
decided that, although Congress used the term "restraint and coer-
cion" in section 8(b)(1)(A), the legislative scheme envisaged a nar-
row construction "limited to situations involving actual or
threatened economic reprisals and physical violence by unions...
to compel [individuals] to join a union or cooperate in a union's
strike activities." 30 The NLRB applied this vision of limited sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) regulatory authority in International Typographi-
cal Union (American Newspaper Publishers)."1 In that case, an in-
ternational union allegedly threatened local unions and members
with summary expulsion if they failed to engage in conduct incon-
sistent with their duty to bargain in good faith. Citing its decision
in National Maritime, the Board dismissed all section 8(b)(1)(A)
allegations. The Board held that "Congress unmistakenly intended
to, and did, remove the application of a union's membership rules
to its members from the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(1)(A), irre-
spective of any ulterior reasons motivating the union's application
of such rules or the direct effect thereof on particular
employees. 32
A lower federal court agreed with the Board's position in
American Newspaper Publishers v. NLRB.33 The court explained
that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) enables labor organizations
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under
section 7 of the Act "so long as such restraint or coercion consist[s]
only of the exercise by the labor organization of its rights over the
29. National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1949).
30. International Typographical Union (American Newspaper Publishers), 86 N.L.R.B.
951, 956 (1949) (describing the NLRB's holding the previous year in National Maritime),
enforced, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), afl'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); but see
District 50 UMW Local 12419 (National Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 N.L.R.B. 628 (1969) (dis-
cussing the rejection of this view of section 8(b)(1)(A)).
31. International Typographical Union (American Newspaper Publishers), 86 N.L.R.B.
951 (1949), enforced, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 100
(1953).
32. Id. at 957.
33. American Newspaper Publishers v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd on
other grounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
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acquisition or retention of membership in such organization." '
However, this allocation of section 8(b)(1)(A) liability was mislead-
ingly straight-forward. Left unresolved were a number of ques-
tions. Is a court enforceable union fine an internal sanction beyond
the proscriptions of section 8(b)(1)(A)? Is it the type of economic
coercion Congress intended to outlaw through section 8(b)(1)(A)?
Further, what if union discipline contravenes the policies that form
our labor laws?
The Board answered some of these questions in Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co.s5 In that case, a union fined a member $500
because he failed to perform picket duty during a strike.36 The
Board rejected the argument that section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits a
union from enforcing obligations of membership through court en-
forceable fines. "[T]he proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) precludes any
such interference with the internal affairs of a labor
organization.
3 7
34. Id. at 797. This case consolidated three NLRB decisions, one of which involved
union threats to expel members for violation of a rule forbidding them to work in a shop
with nonunion members. Id. As the court additionally stated,
Congress left labor organizations free to adopt any rules they desired gov-
erning membership in their organizations. Members could be expelled for any
reason and in any manner prescribed by the organization's rules, so far as
[section] 8(b)(1)(A) is concerned. This interpretation has support in the leg-
islative history of the Act.... It is not within the power of the courts to write
into this section of the Act, by interpretation, language which would broaden
its scope....
.. [T]he proviso in [section] 8(b)(1)(A) permits unions to enforce their inter-
nal policies upon their membership as they see fit. Id. at 800-01, 806.
35. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
36..Id. at 729.
37. Id. The Supreme Court had not yet registered its vote. Two Supreme Court deci-
sions, neither involving union discipline, decided in the early 1960s dispatched contradictory
signals. In 1961 the Court held that an employer violates sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the
Act by recognizing a minority union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its em-
ployees. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The
Court also held that the minority union's accepting recognition violates section 8(b)(1)(A)
because "Congress [intended] to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wag-
ner Act imposed on employers with respect to violations of employee rights." Id. at 738.
This was a curious holding for a Court that, just the prior term, in NLRB v. Drivers
Local 639 (Curtis Brothers), had adopted a far narrower view of the reach of section
8(b)(1)(A). NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Brothers), 362 U.S. 274 (1960). There, the
Court noted that section 8(b)(1)(A) is not a catchall section authorizing the Board to con-
demn economic weapons not explicitly proscribed by the Taft-Hartley Act. Rather, the
tenor of the congressional debates was that the section was intended to make unlawful the
use of force, violence, physical obstructions, or threats thereof associated with organizational
activities and strikes. Id. at 286. As the Court concluded, section 8(b)(1)(A) "is a grant of
power to the Board limited to authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence,
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B. The Board's 1964 Internal Union Affairs Trilogy
In 1964, the Board decided three pivotal cases. Two of these
cases reached the Supreme Court.38 The third, while not reaching
the Supreme Court,3 9 considered an issue that the Court resolved
soon thereafter."0 These three cases highlight the Board's expan-
sionist tendencies. Although the Board originally was committed to
noninterference with internal union affairs, it reversed itself in the
span of less than one year by accepting various limitations and ex-
ceptions that eventually blossomed into a rich source of authority
to regulate internal union government.
The Board's landmark decision, Local 283, UAW (Scofield),
held that, pursuant to section 8(b)(1)(A), it was lawful for a union
to fine members for violating the union's production ceilings.4 1 The
majority reasoned that section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits only "unlawful
... use of force, violence, physical obstruction or threats thereof to
accomplish certain purposes associated with organizational activity
and strikes. '4' Even if section 8(b)(1)(A) has a broader reach, as
the Supreme Court's decision in ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Alt-
mann Texas Corp.) suggests,'3 "internal union disciplines were not
among the restraints intended to be encompassed by the sec-
intimidation, and reprisals or threats thereof - conduct involving more than the general
pressures upon persons employed by the affected employers implicit in economic strikes."
Id. at 290.
38. Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964) (lawful for
union to fine and suspend union member for exceeding union imposed production quota),
enforced sub noma. Scofield v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 423 (1969);
Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers), 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964) (union fine for crossing lawful
picket line lawful), enforcement denied, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 175
(1967).
39. Operating Eng'rs Local 138 (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) (unlawful
for union to fine member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with Board without ex-
hausting internal union remedies).
40. See Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Local 22, 159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966), enforce-
ment denied, 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 418 (1968) (unlawful for union to
expell member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with Board without exhausting in-
ternal union remedies).
41. Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1104 (1964), enforced
sub nom. Scofield v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968), afl'd, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
42. Id. at 1100 (decision by Members McCulloch, Fanning, and Brown). For a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's adoption of this view, see supra note 37. But see Helton v.
NLRB, 656 F.2d 883, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (review of legislative history shows that regu-
lating union conduct involving threats of violence and economic reprisal the primary, but
not the sole purpose of section 8(b)(1)(A)).
43. See supra note 37.
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tion."" The majority explained that even before the proviso was
added to section 8(b)(1)(A), Senator Taft assured his colleagues
that "the sponsors had no intention to interfere with a union's in-
ternal affairs. ' 4 As the Board majority concluded,
[T]he Board has not been empowered by Congress to police a
union decision that a member is or is not in good standing or
to pass judgment on the penalties a union may impose on a
member so long as the penalty does not impair the member's
status as an employee.... [Otherwise] the Board ... [must]
sit in judgment on union standards of conduct for its mem-
bers even though such standards are not enforced by threats
affecting the member's job tenure or job opportunities."
Dissenting, Member Leedom sounded an alarm that has domi-
nated the section 8(b)(1)(A) debate ever since. "Under my col-
leagues' reading of the proviso, it would appear that the Union can
turn any employment matter or Section 7 right into an internal
union affair simply by adopting a union rule or bylaw dealing with
the subject and disciplining employees thereunder. 4 7 Member
Leedom cited a parade of horribles that he posited would be be-
yond the reach of section 8(b)(1)(A) under the majority's
48reasoning.
Concurring, Member Jenkins considered it appropriate for the
NLRB to monitor the type of discipline imposed as well as the
reason for its imposition. He concurred with the majority's conclu-
44. Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1100 (1964).
45. Id. at 1101. See also id. at 1100 (discussing additional pre-proviso legislative history
of section 8(b)(1)(A)).
At the time the proviso was added, Senator Ball, a key sponsor of section 8(b)(1)(A),
assured the Senate that the sponsors had no objection to the proviso because "lilt was never
[their] intent ... to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions. The [pro-
viso] . . .makes that perfectly clear." Id. at 1101. Accord Carpenters Local 720 v. NLRB,
798 F.2d 781, 785 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Local 18, Operating Eng'rs, 503 F.2d 780, 782
(6th Cir. 1974).
46. Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1104. In any event,
the majority concluded, "[t]here is nothing in the legislative history [of the section
8(b)(1)(A) proviso which] suggests that Congress intended to permit a union to ... enforce
the fine by expulsion but not by suing for its collection." Id. at 1101.
47. Id. at 1112 (Member Leedom dissenting).
48. These included union fines imposed for filing unfair labor practice charges against
the union, testifying at an NLRB hearing, filing a decertification petition, refusing to give
the union a copy of a statement made to a Board agent, giving a statement to a Board agent
without the union's approval, refusing to participate in unlawful union activity, working
with nonunion or black employees, and filing a grievance not approved by the union. Id. at
1112 n.37.
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sion, however, finding nothing in the Act regulating a union's au-
thority to impose production ceilings. Hence, the union rule "can-
not be said . . . to offend the Act even if it were . . . unreason-
able . . . .
Seven months later, in Operating Engineers Local 138
(Charles S. Skura), the NLRB considered union discipline im-
posed for reasons offensive to the Act - filing unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB without first exhausting internal union
remedies.50 Abandoning the view that section 8(b)(1)(A) is limited
to violence or physical obstruction, or threats thereof, used to ac-
complish ends involving organizational activity and strikes, the
Board unanimously held that union discipline may not "run
counter to other recognized public policies .... " 1 The Board then
reasoned that there exists an "overriding public interest" that no
private organization should be permitted to prevent or regulate ac-
cess to the Board.52
The Board's reasoning in Skura, that no private organization
may impede Board processes, seems to encompass union attempts
to regulate access to the Board through purely internal means,
such as expulsion. This is so notwithstanding the Board's previous
assurances that unions may expel members for any reason without
violating section 8(b)(1)(A) 3 Indeed, within a week of its Skura
decision, the Board applied this reasoning to cases involving only
expulsion from union membership."
Skura arguably is the most significant of all NLRB union dis-
cipline cases because it positions the Board as the dominant union
discipline regulator. By claiming the power to invalidate any union
discipline that contravenes "other recognized public policies," the
Board controls the union disciplinary process because of its au-
thority to define "public policies" and to adjudicate the issue of
contravention. No union discipline can escape this net.
Two months after its decision in Skura, the Board decided the
49. Id. at 1104 (Member Jenkins concurring). Member Jenkins also noted that the fines
were enforced against members who had joined the union freely and who were free to escape
the rule by resigning. Id.
50. Operating Eng'rs Local 138 (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
51. Id. at 682.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.




third of its 1964 trilogy: Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers).55 Allis-
Chalmers raised the issue of whether section 8(b)(1)(A) proscribes
the imposition of union fines on members for crossing lawful picket
lines. Three members of the Board 6 held that fining members who
cross a lawful picket line "is a far cry from ... Skura.' ' 57 The fine
was within the "competence of the union to enforce" because it
sought to promote a legitimate union interest - the preservation
of the union's integrity during a strike, a "time of crisis for the
union."6 8 Moreover, the fine did not interfere with the enforcement
of the Act, as was the case in Skura, and the strike and picket lines
were lawful.59
The Allis-Chalmers majority should have stated that its rea-
soning was a "far cry" from Scofield, not from Skura. In Scofield,
this same majority recognized a congressional intent mandating
NLRB abstention from the regulation of internal union discipline
when a member's employment status is not affected.60 Skura modi-
fied that approach in an exceptional context, when a union fined a
member to deter access. to the Board's unfair labor practice
processes. Although the majority in Allis-Chalmers did not mea-
sure the union's actions by whether they override public policies,
it, nevertheless, did note the legitimacy of the union's interest, the
effect on the Act's administration, and the lawfulness of the strike
and picketing. 1 In addition, Member Jenkins, concurring, urged
that the Board inquire into the procedural regularity of the disci-
pline.62 Armed with the power to act as arbiter of legitimate moti-
vations and procedures and to determine their effect on other pub-
55. Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers), 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), enforcement denied, 358
F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
56. Members McColloch, Fanning, and Brown.
57. Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers), 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 70 (1964).
58. Id.
59. Id. Member Jenkins, concurring, argued for even greater NLRB jurisdiction to limit
autonomous union governance. He adopted the Skura limitation that the permissibility of
the union's discipline of its members must be measured by its offense to the Act itself and
to any other policies "which the [Taft-Hartley Act] is designed to implement." Id. at 71
(Member Jenkins concurring). In addition, he would require that the union publish the
membership obligation it seeks to enforce. He emphasized that the union should be able to
enforce its rules if at the time the employee chooses to become a union member, the em-
ployee is on notice, through published union rules, of the offense with which the member
has been charged. Id. Finally, he twice emphasized that the union was limited to imposing
"specified disciplinary action" for violation of previously published obligations of member-
ship. Id.
60. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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lic policies,, the NLRB became the internal union discipline
regulatory czar. Ultimately, the Supreme Court considered
whether Congress intended to vest such power in the NLRB.
C. The Supreme Court's Union Discipline Cases
The first case to reach the Supreme Court was NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.6" Four members of the Court agreed
with the majority of the Board in Local 283, UAW (Scofield) that
section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to regulate internal union af-
fairs. By enacting section 8(b)(1)(A), "Congress did not propose
any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside
from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect
a member's employment status."6'
The next year the Court decided NLRB v. Marine & Ship-
building Workers.s This case raised the issue, confronted in Oper-
ating Engineers Local 138 (Charles S. Skura), of whether a union
may discipline a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge
against the union without first exhausting internal union remedies.
However, the case differed significantly from Skura in that the
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers Union expelled, but did not
fine, the member.
The NLRB urged the Court to apply Skura, a union fine case,
to Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, a union expulsion case. As the
63. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
64. Id. at 195. For a discussion of the legislative history relied on by the Court in reach-
ing this conclusion, see supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
The Court in Allis-Chalmers reasoned that by adopting the LMRDA in 1959, "thought
to be the first comprehensive regulation by Congress of the conduct of internal union af-
fairs," Congress did not intend to regulate internal union affairs by enacting section
8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 193-194. Accord NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73 n.8 (1973). The
Court raised, but did not resolve, issues of unreasonably large fines, punishment for disobe-
dience of a fiat of a union leader, and the enforceability of fines against those who pay dues
and fees to the union but are not full members. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 175, 388
U.S. 192-193, 195 (1967).
Justice White, writing a swing-vote concurring opinion, was troubled by the breadth of
the plurality's reasoning. He said, "There may well be some internal union rules which on
their face are wholly invalid and unenforceable." Id. at 198 (White, J., concurring).
The four dissenters parted with the majority because "the Court fails to distinguish
between court-enforced fines and fines enforced by the traditional method of expulsion."
The proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) protects only the latter. Id. at 214 (Black, J., dissenting).
In short, at least eight of the nine justices agreed that whatever regulatory authority the
NLRB may possess with respect to court enforceable fines, it has none with respect to
purely internal union discipline such as expulsion.
65. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
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Board explained in Cannery Workers Union, decided the same
week as Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, "We are unable to con-
clude that a reasonable reading of the proviso to section
8(b)(1)(A), permits a valid distinction to be drawn between fines
and expulsions. . . . [Flines and expulsions are to receive equal
treatment under the proviso .... 66
The Supreme Court agreed with the NLRB that the expulsion
violated section 8(b)(1)(A), but on grounds considerably more lim-
ited than those advanced by the Board. 7 The Court reasoned that
section 8(b)(1)(A) assures unions the freedom of self-regulation
only "where its legitimate internal affairs are concerned." 6 The
Court rejected as overly broad the position of the Board in Skura
that "[any coercion used to discourage, retard, or defeat.., access
[to the Board] is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organi-
zation." 9 The Court agreed that unions have a legitimate interest
in encouraging exhaustion of expeditious internal union remedies. 0
At the same time, however, the Court held that expulsion for
failure to exhaust such remedies prior to filing a charge with the
NLRB was impermissible under the particular facts of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers. The public interest in expeditious resolu-
tion of unfair labor practices overrode this union interest because
the grievance brought to the Board involved not only the union
but also the employer. "The employer might also have been made
a party and comprehensive and coordinated remedies provided....
[Accordingly, the] internal [union] procedures plainly [are] inade-
quate to deal with all phases of the complex problem concerning
employer, union, and employee member."' 71 As the Court summa-
rized, "the overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to
the Board the only healthy alternative, except and unless plainly
internal affairs of the union are involved."' 2 In Marine & Ship-
building Workers, given the employer's interests and the need for
remedies beyond those available through internal appeal mecha-
66. Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 846-47 (1966), afl'd 396 F.2d 955 (1968).
The Board distinguished its decision from Tawas Tube Products, Inc., which held that a
union may expel a member who files a decertification petition with the NLRB. Tawas Tube
Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965). See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
67. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391.U.S. 418 (1968).
68. Id. at 424.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 425-26.
71. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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nisms, the nature of the grievance brought to the Board raised "a
matter that is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs
of the union.
'73
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers departed from Allis-Chal-
mers by focusing on the legitimacy of the union's interest in disci-
plining members and by evaluating whether the discipline impeded
access to the Board. For the first time, the Court disregarded the
plain language of section 8(b)(1)(A) and proscribed expulsion from
union membership when the reason for the expulsion does not in-
volve "plainly internal affairs of the union."' 7' It is unclear whether
this approach applies only to Board access cases. It also is unclear
whether a union may require exhaustion of internal remedies if the
unfair labor practice can be. redressed adequately through the
union's internal appeal procedures.
75
The last of the Board's three 1964 internal union affairs cases
to reach the Supreme Court was Scofield. 6 In Scofield v. NLRB,
Court dicta transformed the simple logic of the Board's opinion
into a formidable six part test. Justice White, writing for a seven
member majority, acknowledged the holding of Allis-Chalmers,
which was that Congress did not propose any limitations with re-
spect to union enforcement of internal affairs aside from "'barring
enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's
employment status.' ",77 Yet, the Court added that "if the rule in-
vades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws[,] the rule
may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating
[section] 8(b)(1)[(A)]." 78 To these two limitations, the Scofield ma-
73. Id. at 426 n.8. Accord Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969) (union discipline
deterring access to the NLRB violative of section 8(b)(1)(A) "at least where the members'
complaint [to the NLRB] concerned conduct of the employer as well as the union").
74. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968).
75. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan questioned whether there "are member-
union grievances untouched by the various federal labor statutes .. " Assuming there are,
he reasoned, a member should not be required to guess in each case. Id. at 429. See also
Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 688 (1981) (the right to require exhaustion, based on policy
of forestalling judicial interference with internal union affairs, not applicable to "issues
rooted in statutory policies extending far beyond internal union interests").
76. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). Curiously, Scofield was the first of the three
cases to have been decided by the Board.
77. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969). As the Court also stated, the union may
not enforce discipline "through means unacceptable in themselves, such as violence or em-
ployer discrimination." Id. at 430-31. This construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) "emphasizes
the sanction imposed, rather than the rule itself, and does not involve the Board in judging
the fairness or wisdom of particular union rules .. " Id. at 429.
78. Id. at 429 (citing Operating Eng'rs Local 138 (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679
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jority added four more: 1) the rule must be a "properly adopted
rule," 2) it must "reflect a legitimate union interest," 3) it must be
"reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave
the union and escape the rule," and 4) the amount of the union
fine must not be "unreasonable.
'7 9
It has been argued that Scofield turned Allis-Chalmers on its
head and invited conflict:
social conflict as to the bounds of legitimate union interests,
judicial and political-administrative conflict (in and over the
Board) as to what Congress had or had not imbedded in the
law, and internecine conflicts among workers, some of them
tempted to leave the unions and escape the rules at oppor-
tune times.80
After Scofield, much of the litigation revolved around the determi-
nation of which of the several limitations Scofield expressed would
find a permanent home in section 8(b)(1)(A).
In NLRB v. Boeing Co., the Court began to retreat from
Scofield's expansive interpretation of the scope of NLRB regula-
tory authority under section 8(b)(1)(A). 81 Holding that the reason-
ableness of union fines is a state court issue, not a section
8(b)(1)(A) concern, the Court stated, "[W]e recede from the impli-
cations of the dicta in [the] earlier cases [of Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield]. '"8
The retreat in Boeing had two additional components. First,
the Court explained that union discipline is beyond the scope of
section 8(b)(1)(A) unless it affects the employer-employee relation-
ship or violates a policy of, or is otherwise prohibited by, the Wag-
ner Act.83 There was no suggestion that NLRB scrutiny should ex-
tend to congressional policies beyond those found in the Act.
Second, the Court reaffirmed the national commitment to NLRB
(1964) and NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968)) (emphasis
added).
79. Id. at 430..
80. Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1268, 1311 (1988).
81. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
82. Id. at 72. Cf. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (adopting the
Scofield dicta that members who are disciplined must be free to leave the union and escape
the rule).
83. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73, 78 (1973).
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nonintervention in internal union affairs. "While the line may not
always be clear between those matters that are internal and those
that are external, 8 4 one critical consideration is the degree of
NLRB involvement in "strictly internal union affairs" that would
be required should the NLRB attempt to regulate a particular as-
pect of union governance.85 For example, "[t]o the extent that the
Board [would be] required to examine into such questions as a
union's motivation for imposing a fine it would be delving into in-
ternal union affairs in a manner which we have previously held
Congress did not intend.""
Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB signals a further retreat
from Scofield.87 By holding that it was unlawful for a union to re-
strict members who wanted to resign from the union, the Court
defined the sweep of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso. The Court rea-
soned that Congress intended that "a union should be free to 're-
fuse [a] man admission to the union, or expel him from the
union.'"" The Court did not suggest that the autonomy to expel
members was dependent on whether the reason for the expulsion
frustrated any policy in the Taft-Hartley Act or any other labor
law.8
9
The Supreme Court's retreat from Scofield is significant but,
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Court also explained that its Allis-Chalmers decision was based on the con-
clusion "that Congress had not intended by enacting [section 8(b)(1)(A)] to regulate the
internal affairs of unions to the extent that would be required in order to base unfair labor
practice charges on the levying of ... fines [for crossing a lawful picket line]" (emphasis
added). Id. at 73.
87. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
88. Id. at 109 (quoting Senator Taft's discussion of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso) (em-
phasis in original).
89. This view of the proviso, albeit dicta in Pattern Makers', conforms with the Board's
pre-Cannery Workers view. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text. But, this view
departs from the dicta in Scofield that "if the [union] rule invades or frustrates an overrid-
ing policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without
violating [section] 8(b)(1)[(A)]" (emphasis added). Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429
(1969) (citing Operating Eng'rs Local 138 (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) and
NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968)). The Court did not satisfac-
torily explain how its decision in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers conforms with the section
8(b)(1)(A) legislative history because the Court erroneously described Marine & Shipbuild-
ing Workers as involving a "rule [that] was enforced by the imposition of fines ... " Pattern
Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 109 n.20 (1985). For a discussion of post-Scofield
judicial recognition that expulsion and other forms of union discipline should be treated
differently, see NLRB v. Local 18, Operating Engineers, 503 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1974), and
infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
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as yet, uncertain. The legitimacy of the Board's role as a dominant
internal union affairs regulator depends on the Scofield dicta stat-
ing that the union majority may not enforce an obligation of union
membership, by either fine or expulsion, if the union either has no
legitimate interest for invoking the discipline, or the discipline
frustrates overriding labor law policies." The Court has not aban-
doned these exceptions; after all, Marine & Shipbuilding Workers
has not been overruled. However, the post-Scofield union disci-
pline cases counsel moderation in applying the exceptions. There is
little evidence that the NLRB has heeded this counsel, or even ac-
knowledged it.
II. NLRB INTERVENTION WHEN UNION DISCIPLINE IS SEEN TO
FRUSTRATE LABOR POLICIES IN THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A. The NLRB's Frustration of Congressional Intent
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Scofield v. NLRB, the
NLRB has invalidated additional categories of union discipline be-
cause they frustrate overriding labor policies. Although the Board
is tolerant of certain union disciplinary action, it prohibits other
such action. For example, while the NLRB has held that a union
does not violate the Act by expelling or suspending a member for
filing a decertification petition with the Board,91 it also has held
90. The "properly adopted rule" limitation of Scofield has generated little litigation but
is potentially another significant source of NLRB power over union governance. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text. Compare NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142
(9th Cir. 1975) (lawful union discipline must meet requirements of procedural regular-
ity-means of enforcement must not exceed contractual authority of union); Machinist Lo-
cal 707 (Pratt & Whitney), 278 N.L.R.B. 39 (1986) (cancellation of union membership un-
lawful in part because union did not follow its constitution and bylaws), enforced, 817 F.2d
235 (2d Cir. 1987) and Carpenters Local 720 v. NLRB, 798 F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1986)
(NLRB lacks authority to inquire into procedural regularity of union discipline); Helton v.
NLRB, 656 F.2d 883, 894 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (requirement of "properly adopted rule" may
not be applicable when union discipline not arbitrary or discriminatory). See also Boiler-
makers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971), reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 967 (1971) (LMRDA re-
quirement of procedural regularity in union discipline does not require discipline limited to
offenses listed in union's constitution and bylaws).
91. Steelworkers Local 4028, 154 N.L.R.B. 692 (1965), enforced sub nom. Price v.
NLRB, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967) (suspension); Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B.
46(1965) (expulsion). When a union expels a member who files a decertification petition,
the union is advancing a "legitimate union concern." The filing of the petition constitutes
an attack upon "the very existence of the union as an institution," and the union, acting in a
"defensive" manner, may expel the member for filing the petition. In a contest for support,
the union requires unity and it need not tolerate an active opponent within its ranks. Tawas
Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 48 (1965). Accord Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443, 447
(9th Cir. 1967) (unless union can expel member seeking its destruction during pre-election
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that a union may not impose a court enforceable fine for filing such
a petition.92 Discipline for filing union security deauthorization pe-
titions is similarly evaluated.93 The Board also bars a union from
fining a member for supporting a rival union in order to oust the
incumbent union; but the Board permits the union to expel such a
member or bar the member from holding office. 9 ' Still, the Board
does not permit any discipline of members who file unit clarifica-
tion petitions, reasoning that these are more akin to unfair labor
practice charges than decertification petitions.
9 5
campaign, member could campaign against union while remaining a member and, therefore,
privy to strategy and tactics).
92. Molders' Union, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. 208 (1969). The Board explained:
when a union only fines a member because he has filed a decertification peti-
tion, the effect is not defensive and can only be punitive... ; the union is not
one whit better able to defend itself against decertification as a result of the
fine. The dissident member could still campaign against the union while re-
maining a member and therefore be privy to its strategy and tactics.
Id. at 209. See also Transport Workers Local 514, 249 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1980). Therein a fine
for filing a decertification petition was found unlawful. The Board disavowed the adminis-
trative law judge's "gratuitous comments regarding his personal views of Board precedent"
that it is difficult to understand how a fine against a disloyal member was not defensive
when the decertification petition was filed in the midst of an economic strike. Id. at 1171
n.2.
93. Machinists Lodge 113, 207 N.L.R.B. 795 (1973) (fine for filing deauthorization peti-
tion unlawful, but disqualification from holding office lawful).
94. Machine Stone Workers Local 89, 265 N.L.R.B. 496 (1982) (lawful to expel mem-
bers who voted against union in representation election, unlawful to fine them); Los Angeles
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 224 N.L.R.B. 350 (1976) (expulsion lawful); Indepen-
dent Shoe Workers of Cincinnati, 208 N.L.R.B. 411 (1974) (fine unlawful); Tri-Rivers
Marine Eng'rs Union, 189 N.L.R.B. 838 (1971) (fine unlawful, expulsion lawful); Printing
Specialties Union 481, 183 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1970) (fine unlawful, disqualification from hold-
ing office lawful). See also Roofers Local 81 (Beck Roofing Co.), 294 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 131
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1450 (May 26, 1989) (union violated Act by fining and charging a re-initia-
tion fee to members who signed petition repudiating union, even though petition only given
to employer and not filed with Board; petition was initial step toward invoking Board's
processes) enforced, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2477 (9th Cir. 1990). Cf. Warehouse Employees
Local 20408, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1168 (Aug. 31, 1989) (unlawful to
threaten discharge of employee who supported another union and signed petition opposing
incumbent union). But see Sheet Metal Workers' Local 22, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 132
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (Oct. 5, 1989) (union may fine member for dual unionism);
Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1978) (union may fine mem-
bers refusing to support organizing campaign).
For a collection of older cases concerning various aspects of discipline impeding Board
access, see Machinist Lodge 113, 207 N.L.R.B. 795 (1973).
95. Buffalo Newspaper Guild, Local 26, 265 N.L.R.B. 382 (1982) (unit clarification peti-
tion seeking to exclude supervisors from unit - some of whom were union officers - calls
for Board to make objective appraisal of fixed events rather than invoke election process
among employees; only in latter context do union members have legitimate interest in en-
suring solidarity).
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Permitting a union to expel for defensive purposes protects
the union's interest in excluding disloyal members from its politi-
cal community, and deprives dissident members access to the
strategy and tactics of the union.9 6 Yet, by prohibiting fines, the
Board becomes ensnared in the complex process of determining
the motivation underlying the fine.97 In NLRB v. Boeing Co., the
Supreme Court was quite definite: a critical consideration for de-
termining whether the NLRB engaged in unauthorized regulation
of internal union affairs is the degree of NLRB involvement re-
quired for the NLRB to regulate a particular aspect of union gov-
ernance.9 8 For example, "[t]o the extent that the Board [would be]
required to examine into such questions as a union's motivation for
imposing a fine it would be delving into internal union affairs in a
manner which we have previously held Congress did not intend.""
The NLRB ignores this admonition.100
Beyond the Board access cases, the NLRB controls union dis-
cipline to preserve the integrity of the Taft-Hartley Act labor poli-
cies in many additional ways. By failing to distinguish between
fines and expulsion, the Board positions itself to influence eligibil-
ity to participate in the selection of union leaders. Moreover, by
reserving to itself the decision of whether union discipline frus-
trates labor policy, the NLRB adds a new layer of restriction on a
union's choice of economic weapons.
For example, nothing in the Act explicitly prohibits a union
from inducing employees to strike in breach of a no-strike clause.
96. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Bakery Workers' Local 300, 411 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.
1969) (upholding NLRB finding that fine was imposed for filing unfair labor practice charge,
not for strikebreaking); Automotive Salesmen's Ass'n, 184 N.L.R.B. 608 (1970) (strikebreak-
ing motivation rejected in favor of finding motivation, in part, was member's supporting
decertification petition).
98. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74 (1973).
99. Id. See also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers does not require a contrary result. There,
the Board was not required to delve into motivation, as the union acknowledged that its
motivation was to impose discipline because the member filed a charge with the NLRB
without first exhausting internal union remedies. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers,
391 U.S. 418 (1968).
100. See, e.g., Iron Workers, 285 N.L.R.B. 739 (1987) (union discipline invoked for fil-
ing unfair labor practice charge with Board, not for union's asserted lawful motivation),
enforced, 864 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1989); AFTRA, Washington-Baltimore Local, 269
N.L.R.B. 787, 790 (1984) (NLRB accepted union's explanation that fine was for union officer
crossing lawful picket line, not for filing decertification petition with NLRB).
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Such inducement may subject the union to damages I01 or to an in-
junction,1 2 but Congress has specifically chosen not to make a
breach of a no-strike clause an unfair labor practice.108 Neverthe-
less, the Board views union inducement to breach a no-strike
clause as an unfair labor practice when the inducement is effected
through union discipline. The Board reasons that it is seeking to
protect the sanctity of the collective bargaining agreement by dis-
allowing such union discipline.'04
Most union discipline cases involving the breach of a no-strike
clause arise in sympathy strike contexts. Whether the strike
breaches the contract is usually a close question. Sometimes the
Board cannot agree with its administrative law judge 08 or even
agree with its own prior ruling on the question in a given case. 0 6
Yet the Board, superimposing its understanding of the contract,
prohibits a union's expulsion in these circumstances. Conse-
quently, the NLRB, and not the union members, determines who
shall be eligible to nominate union officers, vote for such officers,
and run for elective office. The NLRB thereby removes an eco-
nomic weapon from the union's arsenal.
Related to these cases are those involving discipline of mem-
bers who cooperate with an employer at an arbitration proceeding
101. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
102. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
103. Indeed, Congress has rejected proposals to make the breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement an unfair labor practice. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195,
207 (1962) (Senate approved proposal in 1947 "declaring the breach of a collective [bargain-
ing] agreement to be an unfair labor practice, was dropped and never became law."). In-
stead, Congress "agreed that suits for breach of [collective bargaining agreements] should
remain wholly private and 'be left to the usual processes of the law,' and... would be at the
instance of private parties rather than at the instance of the Labor Board .. " Id.
104. See Carpenters Local 1780, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1328 (Aug.
31, 1989) (unlawful to fine and otherwise discipline member who refused to participate in
sympathy strike found by NLRB to violate no-strike clause); District 50 UMW Local 12419
(National Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 N.L.R.B. 628 (1969) (union's interest must be consid-
ered in balance, but union has no legitimate interest in discipline for refusing to breach no-
strike clause).
105. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 600, 294 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1653,
1654 (June 14, 1989) (contrary to finding of administrative law judge, Board finds collective
bargaining contract specifically prohibits sympathy strike, notwithstanding explicit protec-
tion of employee's right to choose whether "to enter upon any property involved in a lawful,
primary labor dispute .... ").
106. UFCW Local 1439, 275 N.L.R.B. 30 (1985), rev'd, 293 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 130
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1387 (Feb. 28, 1989), corrected, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1601 (Mar. 6, 1989)
(NLRB reversal, sua sponte, of previous factual finding that no-strike clause barred sympa-
thy strikes).
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by giving testimony adverse to other union members. For many
years, the Board has held that a union has a legitimate interest in
disciplining members who inform the employer of alleged job mis-
conduct by other members.10 7 Also well established, however, is the
rule that a union may not discipline a member for giving testimony
adverse to another member at an arbitration hearing. Such disci-
pline is unlawful, not because of any duty the employee owes to
the employer, but because the discipline is seen to obstruct and
impair the contractual arbitration process.108
Between these two extremes are cases where a union disci-
plines a member who consented to an employer request to sign a
witness statement. Employees sign such statements knowing that
the employees named therein will be discharged and the state-
ments may be used in any subsequent arbitration. The Board finds
this discipline unlawful because, by giving the statement, the
member is cooperating with the grievance-arbitration process."0 9
By outlawing discipline of one union member who harms an-
other through arbitration testimony or by filing witness state-
ments, the Board frustrates the union's attempt to maintain har-
mony among the diverse groups within the union." 0 Undermining
group harmony curtails the union's effectiveness as a bargaining
representative. These union discipline cases, which do not involve
the mere exercise of self-evident deduction, present policy choices
which limit the union's use of economic weapons in labor-manage-
ment disputes.1 The Board has not acknowledged the limiting ef-
107. See Local 5795, Communication Workers, 192 N.L.R.B. 556 (1971) (employee re-
ported co-employee's infractions of company work rules properly fined because employee's
job duties do not include such action and union rule bars injury to fellow union members).
Accord Transit Union, Local 1225, 285 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1987).
108. See Teamsters Local 788, 190 N.L.R.B. 24 (1971). Accord UMW Local 1058, 299
N.L.R.B. No. 47, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1044 (Aug. 9, 1990); Teamsters Local 557, 218
N.L.R.B. 1117 (1975). See also Steelworkers Local 5550, 223 N.L.R.B. 854 (1976) (unlawful
to threaten discipline if member testifies at an arbitration hearing against another em-
ployee). Cf. Graphic Communications Union, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1068, 1070 (Dec. 31, 1990) (union may discipline member for giving perjured testimony at
arbitration if perjury established by forum other than internal union procedure).
109. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 269 N.L.R.B. 129 (1984). Accord Cement Work-
ers' D-357, 288 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1988) (unlawful to reprimand member signing witness state-
ment even though no fine, expulsion, or other punishment; union action constitutes coercive
expression disapproving member's conduct, and violates section 8(b)(1)(A)).
110. See Local 5795, Communication Workers, 192 N.L.R.B. 556 (1971) (union rule
prohibiting reporting infractions by fellow members designed to promote harmony).
111. The Board rationally could conclude that the union has no legitimate interest in
disciplining members for reporting other member's rule infractions, whether or not their job
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fect resulting from these union discipline cases.
112
The Board also uses section 8(b)(1)(A) to enforce the second-
ary boycott laws. NLRB cases hold that a union may not discipline
a member for working behind a picket line that violates section
8(b)(4) of the Act.11 The Board does not differentiate between
crossing a picket line to work for an employer with whom the
union has a primary dispute and crossing to work for a neutral
employer. However, some courts recognize the difference. For ex-
ample, in NLRB v. Local 18, Operating Engineers, the union fined
and expelled three members who crossed an unlawful, secondary
picket line to work for a nonunion employer with whom the union
had a primary dispute.1 4 The Board found the discipline unlawful
because it frustrated the secondary boycott laws. The court dis-
agreed, noting that the union has a legitimate interest in prohibit-
ing members from working for nonunion employers and that the
secondary boycott laws privilege union inducement not to work for
the primary employer even in the context of a union unlawfully
picketing in an attempt to embroil neutrals.115 Making such disci-
pline unlawful expands regulation of union economic conduct be-
yond the boundaries of section 8(b)(4) of the Act.1 '
descriptions so require. Indeed, Board members continue to make that argument. See
Transit Union, 285 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1987) (Member Dotson dissenting); Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers, 269 N.L.R.B. 129 (1984) (Member Dennis concurring). Similarly, it would
be rational for the Board to conclude that the union's legitimate interest in promoting har-
mony justifies disciplining members who harm other members through arbitration
testimony.
112. See infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
113. See Plumbers Local 388, 280 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1986); NLRB v. Glaziers Local 1621,
632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980) (unlawful for union to discipline member entering neutral gate
at construction site to work for neutral subcontractor); Operating Eng'rs, Local 77, 298
N.L.R.B. No. 2, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1046 (Mar. 30, 1990) (employees disciplined for failure
to honor picket line). See also Sheet Metal Workers, Local 104, 297 N.L.R.B. No. 179, 134
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1016 (Mar. 28, 1990) (unlawful for union to discipline construction em-
ployee working on equipment manufactured by nonunion employer with whom union had
primary dispute).
114. NLRB v. Local 18, Operating Eng'rs, 503 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1974).
115. Id. at 782-83.
116. Union fines invoked against members who cross an unlawful picket line to work for
neutrals present a different situation. Such discipline violates explicit prohibitions in the
secondary boycott laws. See Bricklayers Local 2, 166 N.L.R.B. 117 (1967) (fining members
working for neutral employer behind unlawful secondary picket line violative of section
8(b)(4) of the Act; remedy includes refund of fines). Accordingly, prohibiting union disci-
pline imposed because a member works for a neutral employer conforms with congressional
policies in the Act. But see NLRB v. Local 18, Operating Eng'rs, 503 F.2d 780, 783-84 (6th
Cir. 1974) (refusal to "enforce the Board's invasion of int[ra]-union discipline" imposed on
employee who crossed a picket line prohibited by section 8(b)(4) of the Act, in part because
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In addition, the NLRB uses section 8(b)(1)(A) to enforce sec-
tion 8(b)(7) of the Act, which regulates recognition picketing.
11
7
Unlike section 8(b)(4), which prohibits inducing or coercing em-
ployees to accomplish objectives proscribed within that section,1 8
section 8(b)(7) does not prohibit such inducement or coercion. It
prohibits only picketing and threats to picket with the objective of
organizing employees or securing recognition." 9 Accordingly, by
outlawing union discipline for crossing a picket line proscribed by
section 8(b)(7), the Board makes inducement to engage in section
8(b)(7) an unfair labor practice. In this manner, the Board again
expands its regulation of union economic weapons beyond that
specifically provided by Congress.
The NLRB's use of control over union discipline to regulate
union economic weapons during labor disputes is more pronounced
in situations involving partial strikes. The Board has argued suc-
cessfully to the lower courts that a union may not discipline a
member for performing mandatory overtime in defiance of a par-
tial strike. 20 Such discipline is seen to frustrate the policy behind
the national labor laws that "[a]n employer is entitled to receive
from a person who opts for continued employment the full and un-
diluted performance of the duties for which he is hired and
paid."'' Union discipline interfering with the employer's interest
"Congress has provided measures to eliminate the threat of secondary boycotts other than
banning a union's discipline of its own membership" - citing injunctive relief and district
court suits for damages). Even when a picket line is lawful, union discipline for crossing the
line to work for a neutral employer violates the secondary boycott laws. For example, in
NLRB v. Plumbers a union fined members who crossed a lawful picket line established by
another union in order to work for a neutral employer. The Board, with court approval,
found this discipline unlawful. NLRB v. Plumbers, 827 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1987).
117. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 520, 298 N.L.R.B. No.
109, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1182 (June 11, 1990) (members disciplined for crossing picket line
established by members' union; fines contravene policy of Taft-Hartley Act, section
8(b)(7)(C)); NLRB v. Retail Clerks'Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975) (member disci-
plined for crossing picket line established by another union violates section 8(b)(7)(C)). See
also Operating Eng'rs Local 101, 297 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1049 (Dec. 29,
1989) (union discipline unlawful because it frustrates secondary boycott and recognition
picketing laws).
118. See supra note 115.
119. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
226-36 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter BARTOSIC & HARTLEY).
120. See NLRB v. Graphic Arts Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1200 (1983). The Board also disallows union discipline for performing mandatory
non-unit work. See Paperworkers Local 5, 294 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1545
(June 15, 1989).
121. NLRB v. Graphic Arts Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1200 (1983).
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in receiving full service for the wages paid is prohibited even when
the refusal to perform assigned work is designed to put economic
pressure on the employer during a labor dispute."" The NLRB
makes the use of union discipline to induce a partial strike an un-
fair labor practice. The Board's rationale is that such practices
contravene a basic policy of the Act: that workers may not work,
receive their pay, and strike at the same time.123 Such a prohibi-
tion provides another example of the NLRB restricting the union's
choice of economic weapons beyond that intended by Congress.
The Board's use of section 8(b)(1)(A) to convert union eco-
nomic weapons that Congress chose not to prohibit into conduct
violative of section 8(b)(1)(A) is not what the Supreme Court in-
tended in Scofield. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, decided
prior to Scofield, the Court chastised the Board for attempting to
use section 8(b)(3) of the Act to enlarge its regulatory power to
restrict the parties' choice of economic weapons beyond those pow-
ers expressly provided by Congress. 24 In Insurance Agents', the
Board attempted to prohibit a partial strike, used as leverage
against the employer during bargaining, by making the union's in-
ducement of the partial strike a violation of the duty to bargain in
good faith. 25 The Court condemned the NLRB's attempt to add to
its arsenal of regulatory authority by using section 8(b)(3) of the
Act to outlaw a union's inducement of partial strikes. Noting that
"Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw par-
ticular economic weapons on the part of unions [and that] ... the
activities here involved have never been specifically outlawed by
Congress,"'2 6 the Court found that the NLRB has no license to de-
termine the permissibility of partial strikes as economic weapons.
The NLRB's attempt to amend the statute administratively frus-
trates a policy of the Act that some activities, left unregulated by
Congress, are to be controlled by the parties themselves.1
2 7
122. Id. at 306 (no-overtime policy adopted to advance union position with its employer
in bargaining); Paperworkers Local 5, 294 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1545 (June
15, 1989) (no non-unit work policy adopted to assist local of same international that was
locked out prevented employer from being able to transfer personnel to locked out plant to
maintain production).
123. See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
124. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487-500 (1960).
125. Id. at 481.
126. Id. at 498.
127. Id. at 499-500 (not the role of the NLRB to determine for itself permissible eco-
nomic sanctions in an "ideal" or "balanced" state of collective bargaining). Accord Garner v.
Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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The principles spelled out in Insurance Agents' are violated
by the Board's cases making it unlawful for a union to discipline a
member for refusing to engage in a partial strike (i.e., for perform-
ing overtime). The Board created unfair labor practices from the
same union economic weapons that the Court concluded Congress
chose to leave unregulated by any governmental authority.12 The
Court could not have intended in Scofield to permit the Board to
accomplish through section 8(b)(1)(A) what it had denied the
Board power to accomplish through section 8(b)(3) in Insurance
Agents'.
Likewise, the Board's no-strike clause and recognition picket-
ing union discipline cases make unfair labor practices out of union
economic inducements that Congress did not choose to proscribe.
Honoring a picket line that breaches a collective bargaining agree-
ment is unprotected activity subjecting those who engage in this
conduct to employer discipline. 12 9 The same is true of honoring a
picket line that violates section 8(b)(7) of the Act.130 Reserving to
the employer the business judgment of whether to discipline those
engaging in this conduct protects national labor policy unless,
given the free play of economic forces, the employer's relative
strength is insufficient to use its right to discipline effectively. It is
not the Board's appropriate role to balance relative bargaining
power. 131
The Court's decision in Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission buttresses the conclusion that
Scofield was not meant to enhance the NLRB's power to limit
union economic weapons.132 In Machinists Lodge 76, state law pro-
hibited union inducement of employees to refuse to perform over-
time work. The Court concluded that "the Act's processes would
be frustrated . . .were the State's ruling permitted to stand." '133
128. See Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132 (1976) (Congress did not intend to outlaw the partial strike); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (Congress did not intend to limit economic weapons
such as harassing tactics).
129. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
130. See, e.g., Claremont Polychemical Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 613 (1972). In this respect,
the secondary boycott laws present a very different analysis. See supra note 115 and accom-
panying text.
131. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-500 (1960).
132. Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132
(1976).
133. Id. at 148.
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Congress intended that such union self-help be left unregulated by
the states and the NLRB.'
3 "
The Board, in its union discipline cases, should not embrace
only those labor policies that enhance its regulatory authority. The
policies enunciated in Insurance Agents' and Machinists Lodge 76
must be acknowledged. They demonstrate, contrary to the Board's
assumption, that union discipline of members who refuse to engage
in conduct neither prohibited nor protected by the Act, does not
frustrate any overriding labor law policy. It is the Board's con-
verting this discipline into unfair labor practice conduct, and de-
termining for itself the permissible use of economic weapons, that
frustrates the Act's processes.
The Board, of course, is authorized to limit economic weapons
that involve threats affecting employment status.1 3 5 The Board
also may prohibit, through section 8(b)(1)(A), union conduct that
parallels employer conduct specifically made unlawful under sec-
tion 8(a) of the Act. ' 6 Finally, through section 8(a)(1), the Board
may discipline employers who use promises of economic benefit to
influence NLRB elections 3 7 and, through section 8(b)(1)(A), may
discipline unions for the same conduct."38 None of these cases,
however, grants the NLRB a general license to identify the em-
ployee conduct it deems unprotected by the Act, and to convert
into an unfair labor practice union discipline that induces such
conduct. Otherwise, NLRB power to regulate union economic con-
duct is limited only by the NLRB's creativity in defining unpro-
tected employee conduct.
A fair question arises whether the dissident union member is
presented with a dilemma: discipline by the union for not engaging
134. Id. at 149.
135. The Board prohibits employer coercion affecting employment status. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (employer threats of economic repri-
sal); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (employer work rule making
union solicitation during working hours at the work place conduct punishable by discharge).
The Board also prohibits union coercion. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
136. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), is perhaps the best
example. Section 8(a)(4) of the Act prohibits coercion for filing charges with the Board or
giving testimony in a Board proceeding; section 8(b)(1)(A) bars union discipline for filing
Board charges. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text. See also ILGWU v. NLRB
(Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (section 8(a)(2) prohibits employer's
grant of recognition to minority union and section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for the
union to accept such recognition).
137. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
138. See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
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in unprotected concerted activity or discipline by the employer for
engaging in such activity.13 9 The new voluntary unionism, guaran-
teeing union members the right to resign from the union and avoid
union discipline," ' demonstrates that this dilemma is illusory.
NLRB v. Graphic Arts Local 13-B presented the argument
that the union should be permitted to discipline members perform-
ing overtime work because the membership voted to discontinue
overtime work, and each member could avoid the rule by leaving
the union. 14 The court rejected this reasoning by stating that "[a]
rule which is inconsistent with our national labor policy must give
way."" 2 The court's reasoning begs the question of whether a rule
prohibiting overtime work, designed to place economic pressure on
an employer during bargaining is inconsistent with national labor
policy if members are free to avoid the rule by resigning.
The discussion above suggests that such a rule should not be
viewed by the NLRB as contrary to national labor policy for sev-
eral reasons. The NLRB should withdraw from regulating union
discipline that frustrates the policies of the Taft-Hartley Act un-
less the inducement inherent in the discipline has been addressed
and prohibited by Congress. s14  The Board would then free itself
from evaluating the motive for union discipline.1 4 4 Such a with-
drawal would be consistent with the Court's mandate not to create
unfair labor practice prohibitions from the parties' choice of eco-
nomic weapons when Congress has not specifically outlawed the
weapon. 1"5 Moreover, such a withdrawal would not abandon help-
less members to a dilemma of facing either union or employer
discipline.1"
139. Concern that a union member cannot escape the unhappy choice of either union or
employer discipline is an underlying consideration in union discipline cases. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Graphic Arts Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1982) (union discipline forcing mem-
bers to engage in unprotected activity impermissible "since it jeopardizes the members' em-
ployment relationships [and] imperils their livelihood . . . ").
140. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
141. NLRB v. Graphic Arts Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982).
142. Id. at 309.
143. Examples of union discipline addressed and prohibited by Congress are found in
the secondary boycott laws, see supra note 116 and accompanying text, and in section
8(a)(4) of the Act, see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144. In Boeing the Court held that the NLRB had no authority to inquire into the
motive for union discipline. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 117-138 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
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B. The NLRB's Failure to Consider Union Interests
Adequately When Balancing Union Interests
Against Overriding Labor Policies
The court's reasoning in NLRB v. Graphic Arts Local 13-B
illustrates the failure, found throughout these cases, to balance the
union's legitimate interest in being permitted to discipline with the
danger that union discipline will frustrate an "overriding" policy in
the labor laws. This need to balance is inherent in the Court's use
of the term "overriding" policy in Scofield v. NLRB, 147 seen in the
decertification cases, 148 recognized as a necessary analytical ingre-
dient in the breach of the no-strike clause cases,1 49 and is a main-
stay throughout the Board's union discipline cases. 15
The new voluntary unionism guaranteed by Pattern Makers'
League v. NLRB must now be factored into that balance. More
than any other recent development in the field of union discipline,
Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB protects the individual from the
effects of majoritarian rule.18 ' The Supreme Court has required a
reevaluation of union discipline cases which involve a member be-
ing able to escape the consequences of having joined the union.1"2
147. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969).
148. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
149. See District 50 UMW Local 12419 (National Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 N.L.R.B.
628 (1969) (NLRB balances frustration of labor policies with union's interest when deter-
mining whether union discipline is lawful).
150. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1161 (1978)
(after balancing union's legitimate interest in maintaining bargaining effectiveness with pol-
icy of employee free choice, NLRB concluded that a union may fine a member for refusing
to support organizing drive). But see infra note 264 and accompanying text (recent NLRB
decisions suggest there is no need to balance union interests and an employee's section 7
interests).
151. See, e.g., Winery Workers Local 186, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1129, 1130 (Sept. 13, 1989) (Member Stevens concurring) (member's freedom to resign from
union and "[give] up the benefits and obligations of union membership" was properly con-
sidered in a case involving a fine for announcing a fixed intent to not honor a union's lawful
picket line); Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159 (Aug. 25, 1978) (a
fine for refusing to assist the union in organizing a campaign interferes with member's free
speech rights, but member free to avoid rule through resignation).
152. See, e.g., NLRB v. IBEW Local 340, 481 U.S. 573 (1987) (member-supervisors'
right to resign from the union at any time and avoid imposition of union discipline consid-
ered in determining whether union violates section 8(b)(1)(B) by disciplining member-su-
pervisors because they worked for employers not having collective bargaining contracts with
the union). Compare Machinists Local 702 v. Loudermilk, 444 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1971) (fin-
ing a member for dual unionism when membership in union is compelled under union shop
agreement violates LMRDA free speech guarantees) with Halsell v. Local 5, Bricklayers, 530
F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (fine for teaching nonunion apprenticeship bricklaying class
1991]
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Resignation from the union permits the former member to choose
not to engage in unprotected concerted activities and thereby
avoid all risk of discipline. 5 3 Certainly, the member who resigns
forfeits the right to participate in the future governance of the
union, but that is the exact choice NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Co. and Pattern Makers' anticipate.
When balancing the interests of the individual, the member-
ship majority, and the public, the fact that the membership major-
ity chose to expel, rather than to fine, a member charged with vio-
lating a membership obligation is significant. This is required by
the explicit guarantee of section 8(b)(1)(A), granting the majority
the autonomy to expel. The Supreme Court endorsed this principle
in Allis-Chalmers.14 In Pattern Makers', the Court restated the
principle that a union's choice of expulsion as a remedy for violat-
ing an obligation of membership should have a significant impact
on the Board's decision. 55 In Meat Cutters Local 81 (MacDonald
Meat Co.), the Board recognized that the logical corollary of the
individual member's right to non-association with the union, the
right to resign, is the membership majority's right to non-associa-
tion with the individual, the right to expel."' This principle has
also been affirmed in the decertification petition union discipline
cases, which distinguish between expulsion and fines. 5 7
In short, Scofield, at a minimum, requires the Board to find
that union discipline contravenes an "overriding" policy in our la-
bor laws. Such a determination requires a balancing that must
weigh the right to resign guaranteed by Pattern Makers'. However,
the right to resign has its concomitant: the union's right to expel.
Hence, in most cases, the unions choice of expulsion to enforce
membership obligations should not be viewed as contrary to any
overriding policy.
does not violate LMRDA's free speech guarantees because member free to leave the union
and avoid union discipline).
153. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 435 (1969) ("If members are prevented from
taking advantage of their contractual rights bargained for all employees it is because they
have chosen to become and remain union members.").
154. See supra note 64.
155. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. See also NLRB v. Local 18, Oper-
ating Eng'rs, 503 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1974) (proviso permits the Board to "restrain
threats or physical violence or secondary boycotts against union members who cross a picket
line but cannot keep the union from expelling them").
156. Meat Cutters Union 81 (MacDonald Meat Co.), 284 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1987).
157. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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C. The Societal Need for Union Self-Governance
The NLRB's control of the unions' right to expel undermines
an important national labor policy favoring democratically gov-
erned independent unions. Only the most substantial counter-
vailing public interests may outweigh the membership majority's
right to an independent democratic union, and the inherent power
to decide who shall govern the union.158 This national commitment
to democratic unions governed independently from the state is well
established. 159 Union democracy is necessary if unions are to per-
form their assigned societal functions. National labor policy is
rooted in the conviction that workers have a right to a voice at the
work place. The best way to secure that voice and give it effect is
through a union that is responsive to membership's concerns.00
Unions have at least two democratic functions. The first is to
provide employees with the dignity gained from participating in
industrial government. The second is to provide employees with an
effective voice in the workplace by replacing the employer's arbi-
trary power with clearly established union rules and procedures
contained in a collective agreement."' To perform these functions
effectively, unions must operate as democratic organizations.1
6 2
Outside the work place, unions stabilize workers' political power by
representing them in the political arena. In order for this political
158. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers does not require a contrary conclusion. It is the
quintessential case of a compelling public interest overriding the union's legitimate interest.
The public interest in access to the NLRB is compelling as evidenced by section 8(a)(4) of
the Act, which protects employees' unimpeded access to the NLRB. The union's interest in
requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies was marginal since the member's unfair
labor practice was rooted in statutory policies involving both the employer and the union
and could not be remedied fully through the union's internal union appeal process. See
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. The public interest in expeditious resolution of
labor disputes by the NLRB simply overrode the union's interest in requiring exhaustion of
an appeal process inadequate to resolve thegrievance. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679,
688 (1981) (union has a right to require exhaustion of internal union remedies unless the
issues raised by a member's grievance are "rooted in statutory policies extending far beyond
internal union interests"). But see Meat Cutters Local 81 (MacDonald Meat Co.), 284
N.L.R.B. 1084, 1085 (1987) (Marine & Shipbuilding Workers based on conclusion that
Board access is a "polic[y] of the labor laws . . . of such significance that [it] may not be
overridden even by the union's congressionally recognized interest in determining who may
and who may not be its members .... ").
159. See Hartley, A Framework For Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATHOLIC
UNIV. L. RaV. 13 (1982) [hereinafter Framework].
160. Id. at 39-44.
161. Id. at 54-56.
162. Id. at 102.
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voice to be truly representative, workers must control the direction
and operation of their unions. " "An effective internal political
process provides such control and checks the misrepresentation of
members' views. In this sense societal democracy depends on union
democracy. ' "
Unions also perform economic functions. They influence the
amount of compensation a worker receives and its form. They pro-
vide job security and protect against capriciousness and error in
personnel decisions. They also make the work environment health-
ier, both physically and psychologically. 165 Moreover, unions' col-
lective bargaining power decentralizes economic decisions.
[A]llocation of power and control to the union . . .creates
centres of power and instruments of control apart from the
State, which then does not become unmanageable or danger-
ously large. Collective bargaining shortens the reach of cen-
tral legal control by establishing a separate structure of in-
dustrial government as an alternative to suffocating
statism.'"6
Unlike businesses, unions lack the "universal quantifier" of profit
margin to gauge the efficiency of the leadership's bargaining
goals. 67 A union's internal political process replaces the market's
influence by ensuring that union leadership is responsive to mem-
bership's needs. It also assures that a labor contract's benefits and
burdens are distributed fairly. "
The importance of union democratic governance should limit
governmental intervention in internal union affairs. Unions cannot
serve as "centres of power and instruments of control apart from
the State," and collective bargaining cannot "shorten[] the reach
of central legal control by establishing a separate structure of in-
dustrial government as an alternative to suffocating statism,' 69
unless unions remain independent, self-governing institutions. It is
"because unions are among the important 'competing units of so-
163. See Hartley, Framework, supra note 159, at 58-61, 103.
164. Id. at 103.
165. Id. at 50-53.
166. Summers, Internal Relations Between Trade Unions and Their Members, 91
INTL. L. REv. 175, 177 (1965) [hereinafter International Relations). See, Hartley, Frame-
work, supra note 159 at 56-58.
167. Munson, The Trade Union as an Organization, 88 MONTHLY LAB.' REv. 497, 500
(1965).
168. Id. at 102.
169. Summers, International Relations, supra note 166, at 177.
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cial and economic aggregation' that their independence from state
control is so vital."M 70 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare summarized the underlying labor policy by stating that
governmental interference should be avoided if it would "under-
mine union self-government[,] . .. weaken unions in their role as
collective bargaining agents[, or] cross over into the area of trade
union licensing and destroy union independence.
17'
When the NLRB prohibits expulsion in circumstances other
than where necessary to protect an overriding public interest, it
undermines union self-governance, reduces their effectiveness as
collective bargaining agents, and destroys union independence.
Self-governance is undermined because NLRB intervention en-
courages dissident members to look to the Board, rather than to
the internal union political process, as the final arbiter of appropri-
ate union policy. For example, if the NLRB permitted the union to
discipline those who perform overtime work against the will of the
membership majority, the dissident wishing to remain a union
member would be forced to participate in the internal union politi-
cal process and persuade the majority to amend the rules and al-
low overtime. When, however, the NLRB superimposes its will
over that of the union majority, the dissident procures a political
victory without expending any political effort. The interests of
those members who worked diligently to persuade the majority to
approve a no-overtime rule are overlooked. In short, when the
NLRB substitutes its own processes for a union's internal political
process, it enhances the importance of the former and undermines
the latter.
The NLRB's union discipline cases have also weakened un-
ions' collective bargaining ability. The NLRB has repeatedly pro-
hibited the use of expulsion to discipline a member who refuses to
participate in a concerted effort to counter employer power during
a labor dispute.17 2 By limiting the unions' ability to discipline their
members, 78 these prohibitions weaken the unions' effectiveness as
collective bargaining agents.
The NLRB's regulatory authority, which enables it to disci-
pline unions when they act "irresponsibly," compromises the un-
170. Hartley, Framework, supra note 159, at 96-97.
171. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959).
172. See supra notes 101-123 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 124-138 and accompanying text.
1991]
Vermont Law Review
ions' independence. This is especially true because the NLRB's
definition of "responsible" union behavior is primarily premised
upon the Board's determination of whether the union conduct in
question undermines national labor policy." 4 As a result of this
power, the NLRB has the ability to control, to a certain degree,
who within the union is permitted to nominate officers, vote for
such officers, and run for union office. This control puts the Board
in a position to influence the outcome of union elections. The
state's commitment to union independence is inconsitent with the
Board possessing unbridled discretion to determine permissible
and impermissible economic weapons, or to determine eligibility to
participate in the selection of union leaders. Union independence
is imperiled when an executive agency of government, and not
Congress, is given the authority to define the scope of responsible
union conduct.
Additionally, when the NLRB limits the ability of unions to
expel members it breaches a social compact encompassed in the
LMRDA. Labor law is committed to "permit[ting] the individual
to share in the formation of union policy."1" That accomplished,
"the case for external regulation of union structure and substan-
tive policy largely collapses." 1I" The social compact has been sum-
marized as follows: "By protecting and fostering democratic
processes within unions, the law can rely on the self-corrective
ability of those processes. The necessity for intervention is reduced
by insuring that unions speak with the voice of those whom they
represent. 1 1 7 The NLRB unjustifiably undermines union indepen-
dence and breaches the social compact when it superimposes its
will to outlaw the union majority's expulsion decision, unless nec-
essary to accomplish an overriding policy embedded in the Act. If
174. See supra notes 111, 124-138 and accompanying text.
175. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959). Accord H.R. REP'. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1959).
176. Hartley, Framework, supra note 159, at 124. Accord Cox, The Role of Law in Pre-
serving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 609, 611 (1959) (justification for union indepen-
dence from the state turns on the union membership possessing the effective tools of self-
government); Summers, American Legislation For Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REv. 273,
300 (1962) ("The law, by protecting democratic rights within the union ... reinforces the
union's claim to remain free, for its decisions are validated by the democratic process."); Id.
at 279 (a primary motive for the enactment of the LMRDA was to protect union democratic
process and thereby eliminate the need for public regulation of union structure and public
policy).
177. Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 AM. ECON.
REv. 44, 45 (1958).
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the Board's unarticulated assumption is that union disciplinary
processes are not democratic, that should be expressed, docu-
mented, and remedied by invoking laws specifically designed to re-
dress the problem, or by amending them if necessary. The answer
is not to undermine union self-governance in the name of enhanc-
ing it.
III. NLRB INTERVENTION WHEN UNION DISCIPLINE IS SEEN TO
FRUSTRATE LABOR POLICIES IN THE LMRDA
A. The Protection of a Member's Right to Participate
in Intra-Union Activities
The NLRB also prohibits union discipline that frustrates poli-
cies embedded in the LMRDA. As early as its Wagner Act deci-
sions, the NLRB held that employers may not interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of internal union
political activities.'7 8 In early Taft-Hartley Act cases, the Board
ruled that intra-union political activities fall within the orbit of ac-
tivities protected by section 7 of the Act.1' 9 In so doing it held that
an employer violates the Act when it makes employment decisions
based on intra-union activities'"0 or otherwise impedes an active
political process within the union. 181 In addition, the Board held
178. See In re Fairfield Eng'g Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 827 (1947) (employer violated section
8(1) of Wagner Act by interfering with outcome of intra-union dispute by assisting in effort
to oust incumbent president).
179. See In re Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 75 (1950) (employee criticism of bar-
gaining position adopted by union protected by section 7 from employer threats), enforced,
189 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir. 1951) ("Attempts by some members of a union to bring about a
change in the union's attitude about particular collective bargaining contracts is certainly
'concerted activity' protected by section 8(a)(1) of the Act."), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919
(1952).
180. See NLRB v. Lummus Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 229 (11th Cir. 1982) (discharge of
employee for distributing leaflet criticizing quality of representation unlawful); Toledo
World Terminals, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1503 (June 30, 1988)
(employer may not hire through hiring hall it knows discriminates against union dissidents);
Zero Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 495, supplementing Vulcan-Hart Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 167 (1982)
(employer may not condition reinstatement of discharged employee on employee relinquish-
ing currently held union office); Mascali Constr. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 219 (1980) (unlawful to
discharge employee because of activity in support of dissident group opposed to incumbent
union leadership); A & B Zinman, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1512 (1965) (employer may not dis-
charge employee because employee became a candidate for union office), enforced, 372 F.2d
444 (2d Cir. 1967).
181. See Machinists District Lodge 91 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1987) rev'g 279
N.L.R.B. 973 (1986) (employer may not ban employee from parking car in company parking
lot bearing four-by-six foot sign endorsing candidate for union office); NLRB v. Methodist
Hospital of Gary, Inc., 733 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1984) (employer may not refuse union use of
1991]
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that union leadership may not threaten to affect job status because
of intra-union activities.
82
Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Construction Co.) represented
the Board's first attempt to regulate a union's internal political
process directly.18 There the NLRB held that a union may not
fine a member for opposing an incumbent in a union election and
successfully challenging the election."" The NLRB found support
for its decision in the Supreme Court's Scofield v. NLRB decision.
In Scofield, the Court stated that the "Board is charged with con-
sidering the full panoply of congressional labor policies in deter-
mining the legality of a union fine," including those supporting in-
dependent democratic unions found in the LMRDA.1 85
The primary problem facing the Board since its decision in
Graziano has been how to implement LMRDA union democracy
policy using its regulatory authority under the Taft-Hartley Act.
cafeterias to conduct election for bargaining committee when no showing that election
would be disruptive or interfere wilth patient care); Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402
(1982) (employer may not permit bulletin board to be used for personal notices but prohibit
its use to announce union meetings); Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 420
(1981) (employer may not prohibit posting or distribution of intra-union campaign litera-
ture in nonworking areas on nonworking time and soliciting votes for intra-union election on
nonworking time).
182. See National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 423 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970) (unlawful to
deny seaman registration for employment because of opposition to incumbent administra-
tion of union); Graphic Communications Local 388, 287 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1988) (threat to
refuse to represent fairly employee who challenged intra-union election unlawful); Laborers
Local 282, 271 N.L.R.B. 878 (1984) (causing discharge because employee supported incum-
bent's political opponent unlawful); Hoisting and Portable Eng'rs Local 4, 189 N.L.R.B. 366
(1971), enforced, 456 F.2d 242 (1st Cir. 1972) (violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) in refusing to
refer from nonexclusive hiring hall because member opposed re-election of incumbent union
officials). See also Laborers Local 806, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1125
(July 10, 1989) (assaults and acts of physical violence against members because of dissident
union activities unlawful); Teamsters Local 745, 240 N.L.R.B. 537 (1979) (threat by union
official of physical harm for dissident activity violates Act). But cf. East Texas Motor
Freight, 262 N.L.R.B. 868 (1982) (violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) to condone physical attack
on dissident by union steward but no violation of Act not to come to assistance of dissidents
attacked by unknown assailants: section 8(b)(1)(A) forbids limitations on intra-union ac-
tions that frustrate labor policy but places no affirmative duty on union to take action to
further policy of the labor laws).
183. Carpenters Local 22, 195 N.L.R.B. 1 (1972).
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. As the Board explained, "[W]e have been charged by the Supreme Court with
the duty of determining the overall legitimacy of union interests, and must therefore take
into account all Federal policies and not limit ourselves to those embodied in our own Act."
(emphasis in the original). Id. n.5. See also Machinists Lodge 91, 298 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 134
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1192, 1194 n.6 (Apr. 30, 1990) (unlawful to disqualify candidate for union
office because of protected dissident activities).
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"It has long been held that Section 7 guarantees to employees the
right to question the wisdom of their representative or to take
steps to align their union with their position . . I' However,
when the union acts as the collective bargaining representative, it
is acting in furtherance of objectives which a majority of the em-
ployees have agreed to support, and is entitled to solid support
from employee-members in seeking to obtain those objectives.187
Accommodating these conflicting, legitimate interests is the
challenge. In section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, Congress tackled
the problem by guaranteeing union members the right to "chal-
lenge," that is, the right to "express any views, arguments, or opin-
ions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization . . .
views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting .. Congress
also provided that
[niothing [in the LMRDA] shall be construed to impair the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable
rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the or-
ganization as an institution and to his refraining from con-
duct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or
contractual obligations.'89
Because Graziano rests upon the Board's authority to enforce
LMRDA labor policies, 90 these cases must be consistent with
LMRDA's policies, especially section 101(a)(2) and its "reasonable
rules" proviso.
In Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, the Court explained that the
free speech protections afforded union members under section
101(a)(2) is considerably narrower than that provided by the first
amendment. 191 The proper order of inquiry requires that courts
(and the NLRB) first consider whether enforcement of the union's
rule interferes with a free speech interest protected by section
101(a)(2). If it does, adjudicators then must determine whether the
union rule is "reasonable," and, thus, protected by the proviso to
186. East Texas Motor Freight, 262 N.L.R.B. 868, 871 (1982).
187. See Winery Workers Local 186, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1129
(Sept. 13, 1989) (union has reasonable expectation of support from members regarding deci-
sion to strike).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1988) (corresponds to 73 Stat. 519, 522 (1959)).
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
191. Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).
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section 101(a)(2).111 Therefore, unlike the first amendment, section
101(a)(2) of LMRDA permits union rules to restrict a member's
freedom of speech if the rules are reasonable. 19 "By way of the
proviso of section 101(a)(2), nothing in the statute is to impair the
union's right to enforce its reasonable rules. The Constitution ac-
cords no similar overriding interest in law enforcement that would
automatically negate a constitutional right simply because there
was a reasonable interest in prosecution.'1
4
When members voice opposition to union policies, the NLRB
must balance the need for free expression within the union against
the union's need for solidarity. Accordingly, the Board prohibits
unions from disciplining a member for internally advocating a dis-
senting view to a proposed union policy. Teamsters Local 610 is an
example of the Board's attempt to balance these two conflicting
policies. 96 Therein, the Board ruled that a union may not disci-
pline a member for seeking to persuade other members to vote to
accept a contract offer that the union leadership believes to be un-
satisfactory.196 Section 8(b)(1)(A) offers similar protection to mem-
bers who appeal to the international union to protest inadequate
representation by local union leaders.
97
Section 8(b)(1)(A) does permit discipline of members who ad-
vocate disobeying an existing lawful group decision. For example,
in Winery Workers Local 186, the NLRB approved the imposition
of a fine on a member for announcing at a union meeting an "abso-
lute intention to defy any union call for lawful strike action" and
192. Id. Accord M. Malin, supra note 16 at 78-79.
193. Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).
194. Massey v. Inland Boatmen's Union, 886 F.2d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982)) (emphasis in original). See
Malin, supra note 16 at 78 (burden of proving that a union's restraint on speech is privi-
leged by the proviso "is not as stringent as the burden of establishing a compelling state
interest to justify restraints under the First Amendment to the Constitution").
195. Teamsters Local 610, 264 N.L.R.B. 886, 905 (1982).
196. Accord Machinists Local 707 (Pratt & Whitney), 276 N.L.R.B. 985 (1985) (unlaw-
ful for union to process internal union charges against member for distributing leaflet accus-
ing local union leadership of serious wrongdoing).
197. See Steelworkers Local 5163, 248 N.L.R.B. 943 (1980) (violation of section
8(b)(1)(A) to threaten to sue dissidents because they filed grievance with international
union complaining about inadequate representation by local - failure to appoint steward
and police plant safety - and sought recall of local union president); Groves-Granite, 229
N.L.R.B. 56 (1977) (threat of "executive board action" against member who complained to
state council regarding representative's performance of union duties violates section
8(b)(1)(A)).
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urging others to do the same.198 In Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M
Grocers), the Board held that a union may discipline members who
refuse to support an organizing campaign. 9 The Board reasoned
that the union's rule "restrict[ed] its members' exercise of free
speech during an organizational drive [but] only in a manner con-
sistent with their voluntary membership status in the Union.
20 0
This rule gives a member the choice between participation in the
affairs of the union and exercising those rights guaranteed by sec-
tion 7 of the Act:
[a]s members they participate in the election of officers and
in the other internal affairs of the Union which lead to the
decision to organize particular employees. They are free to re-
sign any time the Union sets out on a course they do not
agree with .... However, as long as they remain members, the
Union has a right to expect their support, including actual
participation in the Union's organizational efforts.""'
The Board's cases, then, define "reasonable rules" by distinguish-
ing between those rules that restrict a member's right to advocate
a change in union policy through democratic means and those that
limit a member's ability to advocate disobedience of a current pol-
icy. The same distinction is made under section 101(a)(2) of
LMRDA20
198. Winery Workers Local 186, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1129 (Sept.
13, 1989). The Board reasoned that the union has a legitimate interest in promoting mem-
bership solidarity in an impending strike situation and the member's conduct exceeded
merely an attempt to advocate a dissenting point of view and advocate an alternative to
economic action. Id. at 1130. See also Teamsters Local 610, 264 N.L.R.B. 886, 905 (1982)
(union may discipline members for attempting to persuade others to abandon strike and
cross picket line - at least when done in the presence of management).
199. Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1978).
200. Id. at 1161.
201. Id. Closer questions arise when the union majority has reached a decision and a
member continues to advocate a contrary position but does not advocate civil disobedience.
In Operating Eng'rs Local 400 (Hilde Construction Co.), a Board majority held that a union
may not impose a fine on members who held an unofficial meeting to discuss current negoti-
ating positions of the union and employer with a view toward persuading the union leaders
to modify strategy or hold a second strike vote. Operating Eng'rs Local 400 (Hilde Constr.
Co.), 225 N.L.R.B. 596 (1976). Member Murphy dissented. She noted that the decision to
strike had been presented to the membership in a democratic way and the union now had a
right to present, publicly at least, a unified front. The dissidents had frustrated that interest
in solidarity by publicly voicing their dissent by advertising the unofficial meeting on TV
and in the local newspaper. Id. at 596 (Member Murphy dissenting).
202. Compare Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.
1973) (violation of section 101(a)(2) of LMRDA to discipline member for meeting with other
members to urge that negotiating committee change bargaining strategy) and Boilermakers
v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965) (violation of section 101(a)(2) to expel member who
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B. The Membership's Right to Form Dissident Factions
An action closely related to the encouragement of opposition
to union policy is an attempt to form an intra-union dissident
group in an effort to make that opposition effective. The Board
and the courts disagree on how extensively section 8(b)(1)(A) regu-
lates this purely internal union activity. There is a limited consen-
sus that efforts to organize internal union opposition in order to
effectuate a change in union policy is protected activity under sec-
tion 7 of the Act and that an employer may not interfere with em-
ployee efforts on behalf of intra-union rival factions.2 °0 Disagree-
ment arises when section 8(b)(1)(A) is used to prohibit union
leadership interference with a member's efforts to organize a rival
political faction within the union.
In Teamsters Local 515, the NLRB held that section
8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit union leadership from removing a ri-
val faction's literature from a union bulletin board.210 The dispute,
the Board reasoned, concerned a purely internal union matter that
did not involve threats of violence, economic reprisal, or disci-
pline.2 05 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that neither the
dicta in Scofield v. NLRB nor the Board's own precedent limits
the application of section 8(b)(1)(A) to cases involving violence, ec-
onomic reprisal, or discipline.2 0
urged rejection of pending motion to amend bylaws) with Falcone v. Dantinne, 288 F. Supp.
719 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 420 F.2d 1157 (3rd Cir. 1969).
203. See East Texas Motor Freight, 262 N.L.R.B. 868 (1982) (violation of Act for em-
ployer to refuse to permit posting of intra-union political literature on company bulletin
board reserved for material related to the collective bargaining agreement when limitation
not enforced against others); Transcon Lines, 235 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1978), enforced, 599 F.2d
719 (5th Cir. 1979) (employer violated section 8(a)(1) by prohibiting distribution of rival
faction's internal union political literature in the drivers' room and elsewhere when other
union political literature permitted to be distributed); Roadway Express, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B.
653 (1978) (employer may not interfere with employees' efforts to organize rival intra-union
political group and distribute its literature); Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 487 (1974)
(employer violated Act by refusing to permit employee to distribute newspaper critical of
union bargaining policies to co-workers at their place of employment).
204. Teamsters Local 515, 248 N.L.R.B. 83 (1980), enforcement denied sub nom.
Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
205. Id. at 86.
206. Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883, 888-89, 891-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Board prece-
dent cited by the court was International Union of Electrical Workers Local 601, 180
N.L.R.B. 1062 (1970) (violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) to refuse to accept personal check and
insist on payment of dues through dues deduction), General Motors Corp., 158 N.L.R.B.
1723 (1966) (section 8(b)(1)(A) violation to agree to contract provision banning distribution
of rival union's literature during working hours), and General Motors Corp., 147 N.L.R.B.
509 (1964) (same). For a discussion of NLRB regulation of union discipline for dual union-
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in NLRB v. Oper-
ating Engineers Local 139 that section 8(b)(1)(A) does not give the
NLRB any authority to regulate union factionalism that does not
affect members' job rights, even in cases involving union disci-
pline.2 0 7 The NLRB ruled that the union had violated section
8(b)(1)(A) by fining a member for publishing and distributing a
newsletter that questioned the propriety of certain actions taken
by the incumbent union leadership.20 8 The court of appeals agreed
that publishing and distributing the newsletter was concerted ac-
tivity protected by section 7 of the Act and construed the fine as
an attempt to quiet the member's opposition.20 9 Nevertheless, the
court held that the NLRB did not have any authority under sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the union discipline. Relying primarily
on NLRB v. Boeing Co., the court reasoned that Congress did not
intend for section 8(b)(1)(A) to regulate the imposition of fines
that are not related to the employer-employee relationship. 10 "Be-
cause the union's action in charging and fining [the member] did
not touch the employer-employee relationship, the union did not
commit an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A)
by charging and fining [the member].' 11
C. The Conflict Between
Operating Engineers Local 139 and Graziano
The court's reasoning in NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local
139 would seem to undermine Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Con-
struction Co.). Graziano dealt with the legitimacy of a fine im-
posed for opposing an incumbent union officer and challenging an
internal union election, 21' conduct not "touching the employer-em-
ism see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
207. NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 139, 796 F.2d 985, 990-91 (7th Cir. 1986).
208. Local 139, Operating Eng'rs, 273 N.L.R.B. 992 (1984). The union also had harassed
the member in other ways such as referring him to a job knowing that the job would conflict
with the NLRB hearing in this matter and then informing the state unemployment compen-
sation commission that he had refused a job referral although the union's policy had been
not to release such information to public authorities. NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 139,
796 F.2d 985, 990 (7th Cir. 1986).
209. NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 139, 796 F.2d 985, 989-90
(7th Cir. 1986).
210. NRLB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973). See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text.
211. NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 139, 796 F.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 1986).
212. Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Constr. Co.), 195 N.L.R.B. 1 (1972). Cases such as
Machinists Local 707 (Pratt & Whitney), 278 N.L.R.B. 39, enforced, 817 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.
1991]
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ployee relationship." Indeed, union discipline cases arising solely
out of opposition to union policy would similarly seem to involve
only internal union matters.2" However, the Board has not ac-
cepted the Operating Engineers Local 139 court's interpretation of
section 8(b)(1)(A) and the conflict remains unresolved.2
The Supreme Court's union discipline precedent does not offer
a sound basis for resolving the conflict between Graziano and Op-
erating Engineers Local 139. The dicta in Scofield implies that
union disciplinary measures should not be allowed to frustrate
overriding national labor law policies, not just those found in the
Taft-Hartley Act.2 15 However, the dicta in NLRB v. Boeing Co.
speaks only in terms of Taft-Hartley policies." 6 Because these two
decisions fuel, rather than resolve, the controversy, we must look
beyond Supreme Court union discipline precedent.
For several reasons, advancement of the policies supporting
democratic unions found in the LMRDA should not be cabined by
LMRDA's enforcement mechanisms. These policies should be con-
sidered when regulatory action is taken under section 8(b)(1)(A).
Supreme Court precedent does not preclude the NLRB from con-
sidering LMRDA policies while exercising its Taft-Hartley regula-
tory authority in union discipline cases. In Carpenters Local 1976
v. NLRB (Sand Door),217 the NLRB premised its ruling, in which
it found that the union's conduct violated the Taft-Hartley Act's
secondary boycott prohibitions, on national labor policy found in
the Interstate Commerce Act.21 8 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Board may not supplement its regulatory author-
ity by using the Taft-Hartley Act to enforce congressional policies
found in other statutes "involving significantly different considera-
tions and legislative purposes. "219
1987), must be distinguished. There, the union expelled a member both for factionalism and
for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. Id. at 41-48.
213. See supra notes 188-211 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Machinists Lodge 91, 298 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 4, 6 n.6, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1192, 1194 & n.6 (Apr. 30, 1990) (union violates section 8(b)(1)(A) by suing a member to
enjoin him from entering union hall, attending union meetings, and harassing union mem-
bers because the suit lacked merit and was filed to retaliate for engaging in intra-union
activities, and also by refusing to allow dissident to be nominated for union office in retalia-
tion for his' intra-union political activities).
215. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
217. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
218. Id. at 103.
219. Id. at 110. The issue in Sand Door, and in Graziano, is thus different from that
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The LMRDA, which regulates internal union affairs, certainly
entails significantly different considerations than the Taft-Hartley
Act. The Taft-Hartley Act focuses on labor-management relations
and does not encompass the regulation of internal union affairs.
Yet, the two statutes share similar legislative purposes. As dis-
cussed above, national labor policy is rooted in the conviction that
workers have a right to a voice at the work place, and that the best
way to ensure the effectiveness of their voice is through an organ-
ized group in which the individual has a meaningful voice. 2 Un-
less the individual is permitted to share in the formation of union
policy through a democratic process, the "other provisions of law
[guaranteeing the right of self-organization] may be of little benefit
.... 221 If employees become as voiceless within the union as they
are as individuals, national labor policy would then have merely
substituted the tyranny of the group for the tyranny of an em-
ployer, and would have effected no net gain for the individual.22 In
short, the justification for the Board's consideration of LMRDA
policies, when enforcing the Taft-Hartley Act, is that the policies
underlying the two statutes are inexorably intertwined.
In addition, the LMRDA's statutory scheme anticipates, in-
deed relies on, NLRB involvement. By incorporating in its deci-
sions the various goals of the LMRDA, the Board participates in
"litigating elucidation." By effectuating legislative policies in the
labor laws in this fashion, adjudicatory institutions "participate in
the growth of law" by filling the interstices of federal labor stat-
utes. 223 Nothing in the LMRDA suggests that its interstices should
presented in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB. In Southern Steamship, the NLRB ordered
reinstatement of an employee fired for engaging in a strike otherwise protected by the Wag-
ner Act but inconsistent with policies of federal mutiny statutes. Reversing the NLRB, the
Supreme Court admonished that "the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and
equally important Congressional objectives." Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,
47 (1942). The Graziano issue is not whether the Board may single-mindedly effectuate
Taft-Hartley policies to the detriment of policies in other statutes, but whether the Board
may look to policies in other statutes to find regulatory authority not otherwise available
from the Taft-Hartley Act alone.
220. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text. See also Hartley, Framework,
supra note 159, at 39-44.
221. 105 Cong. Rec. 6,471-72 (1959).
222. Id. at 6,472. For a discussion of the role of union democracy in achieving the goals
of the Taft-Hartley Act, see supra notes 166-177 and accompanying text.
223. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, 147, 170-71 (1968). See also Hart-
ley, Framework, supra note 159, at 120-23 (outlining the various ways the NLRB acts as
"elaborator of congressional policy") (quoting H.'WELLINGTON, supra, at 171).
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be filled only by the Secretary of Labor or the federal courts. In-
deed, the case for advancing labor policy through various adjudica-
tory institutions is particularly strong with respect to the LMRDA
because under that Act, Congress explicitly retained existing rights
and remedies under federal and state laws.
224
Nor is it incongruous that the Taft-Hartley Act, committed to
nonintervention in internal union affairs, should permit NLRB in-
trusion in Graziano-type cases which involve almost purely inter-
nal union affairs and touch the employer-employee relationship
the least.2 25 Coherence is found by understanding that the
LMRDA marked a turning point in congressional labor policy. For
the first time, Congress clearly joined the values of industrial de-
mocracy and union democracy. 2 6 The two section 8(b)(1)(A) ab-
stention principles, the one that permeates all of section
8(b)(1)(A),2  and the other found in the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso
that explicitly limits NLRB authority to regulate expulsion, must
now be read in the context of this shift in national labor policy.
228
However, this shift in labor policy does not justify disregarding the
abstention principles of section 8(b)(1)(A) in contexts other than
those involving union disciplinary measures that threaten union
democracy.
IV. MONITORING THE UNION OFFICER DIRECTION PROCESS
Closely related to the issue of whether Carpenters Local 22
(Graziano Construction Co.) correctly interprets section 8(b)(1)(A)
when applied to discipline affecting membership rights, is the
question of whether the Board may regulate union discipline of of-
ficers that affects their tenure in office. Here, the membership ma-
jority's right to insist that officers fulfill their electoral mandate
224. See LMRDA sections 102 and 603, 29 U.S.C. §§ 412, 523 (1988) (corresponds to 73
Stat. 523, 540 (1959)). To be sure, these sections of the LMRDA only preserve existing
rights and remedies and do not define what they are. At a minimum, however, they demon-
strate Congress' openness to institutions such as the Board participating in the development
of union democracy values found in the LMRDA.
225. See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 158-177 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
228. Arguably, even without the LMRDA, the Board would not exceed its authority by
its reading section 8(b)(1)(A) as authorizing the promotion of democracy within labor un-
ions, for the LMRDA merely recognized, and did not create, union democracy's key role in
effectuating the goal of employee self-regulation. See supra notes 158-177 and accompany-
ing text.
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confronts the reality that subordinate officers may be in the best
position to form rival factions and create an active political process
within the union."" These questions are on the cutting edge of the
issue of the legitimacy of the Board's influence upon unions' inter-
nal political processes.
Union officials may be either elected or appointed. Some fill
constitutional offices, such as president, business agent, secretary-
treasurer, trustee, and safety committee member. Others provide
the union with normal employee services, including secretarial, ac-
counting, legal, and research services. An elected union office or
appointed position may provide full-time employment. Most often,
however, union officers and appointed officials have full-time
outside jobs and only work part-time for the union. Frequently
these officials receive minimal or no compensation, and sometimes
compensation is limited to reimbursement for time their union job
takes from their regular employment.3 0
The question most frequently confronted by the Board in
union officer discipline cases is: what duty of loyalty does a union
officer or employee owe the membership majority and the incum-
bent union leadership? Stated differently, how much authority and
discretion does union leadership have when disciplining union of-
ficers or employees for insubordination? Permeating these ques-
tions is still another: should the Board's rules regulating discipline
differentiate between appointed and elected union officers?
It is well established that when a union takes on the role of an
employer, the Taft-Hartley Act applies "just as it would to any
other employer."2 3 1 Accordingly, a union may not, in the name of
expectations of loyalty or otherwise, interfere with its employees'
attempts to seek representation from another union.2 3 Similarly,
229. See Machinist v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920
(1964).
230. For ease of reference, incumbents in all of these offices and positions will be re-
ferred to as union officers, although only those holding constitutional office are officers of
the union.
231. Office Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 316 (1956); accord Carpenters
Local 35, 264 N.L.R.B. 795, 797-98 (1982).
232. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 925, 279 N.L.R.B. 1051, 1051 (1986) (violation of sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and (3) of Act for union to discharge secretary who sought representation by
another labor organization); District #1, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 259 N.L.R.B. 1258,
1269 (1982) (union violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of Act to discharge legislative repre-
sentative and management trainee for attempts to organize staff). But see Carpenters Local
925, 279 N.L.R.B. at 1051 (no violation of section 8(a)(1) for union to threaten a supervisor
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union employees have the same rights as other employees to seek
redress of grievances within the framework of their existing em-
ployer-employee relationship.
233
To date, the Board has resisted the invitation to dismantle the
long-standing patronage systems found in most unions. However,
the Board has exercised significant control over the selection crite-
ria used to fill appointed union positions. Thus, with respect to
removal, or other disciplinary action, taken against union officers
or employees for engaging in internal union political activities, the
Board has held that a union may take only such retaliatory action
as does not affect membership rights. 4 The union, however, may
remove appointed union officers or employees for seeking to "effect
a change in the top management of their Employer Union.""'
[A]n employee of a union, like any other employee, has no
employed by union with discharge for lending support to office secretary attempting to or-
ganize staff).
233. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 574, 259 N.L.R.B. 344, 352 (1981) (newly elected union
secretary-treasurer violated Act by discharging employee who had written union attorney
seeking assurance that union employees' rights under their collective bargaining agreement
would be honored by new administration); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 28, 252
N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 (1980) (union acting as employer may not discharge business agent for
filing sex discrimination complaint against union with state Fair Employment Practice
Commission protesting discriminatory pay); Tri-State Carpenters Dist. Council, 250
N.L.R.B. 901 (1980), enforced, 661 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1981) (unlawful for union to discharge
employee for pursuing, with the assistance of union representative, back wages awarded in
previous arbitration proceeding); Louisiana Council 17, AFSCME, 250 N.L.R.B. 880, 889
(1980) (union violates sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of Act by threats and discharges of several
employees who acted in concert to protest the firing of another employee of the union). But
compare NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Local 705, 630 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1980) (union privileged
to discharge two business representatives who ignored established procedures by raising pay
dispute at stewards meeting and by distributing wage complaint letters to union's executive
board at luncheon honoring city's mayor), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981) with Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 (1980) (union business agent en-
gaged in protected activities by raising sex discrimination charge against union at monthly
union membership meeting).
It is also clear that an employer violates the Act when, because of intra-union political
activities, it discharges a union officer in its employ. See Welfare and Pension Funds, 251
N.L.R.B. 1241, 1246 (1980) (welfare and pension fund, acting as employer, unlawfully dis-
charged employee in retaliation for employee's decision to run for re-election as secretary-
treasurer of union). Nor may a union induce such an employer to discriminate because of its
employee's intra-union activities. See supra note 182. See also H.H. Robertson Co., 263
N.L.R.B. 1344, 1344 (1982) (unlawful for union to seek discharge of two employees because
they were hired by member-supervisor who was officer of union and was locked in bitter
political conflict with other union officers).
234. See supra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
235. Retail Clerks Local 770, 208 N.L.R.B. 356, 357 (1974) (union, as employer, does
not violate section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging six union employees who supported
losing candidate in intra-union election).
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protected right to engage in activities designed solely for the
purpose of influencing or producing changes in the manage-
ment hierarchy.... An attempt... to influence the selection
of their chief executive officer is not brought within the pro-
tection of the Act because the employer happens to be a
union.
2 3 6
The Board's endorsement of patronage among the appointed
officialdom of the union conforms with LMRDA precedent. In Fin-
negan v. Leu, the Supreme Court held that the discharge of ap-
pointed union business agents by a union president, following his
election over an incumbent for whom the business agents cam-
paigned, did not violate the LMRDA's free speech protections.
3 7
The Court reasoned that permitting the victorious candidate to ap-
point a staff with compatible views fosters "responsiveness to the
mandate of the union election. 2 3 8 Indeed a candidate's victory
"might be rendered meaningless if a disloyal staff were able to
thwart the implementation of his programs. 2 39 In the Supreme
Court's view, the patronage system advances the LMRDA's basic
objective, which is "to ensure that unions [are] democratically gov-
erned, and responsive to the will of the union membership as ex-
pressed in open, periodic elections.
'24 0
The Board's steward appointment cases also permit union
leadership to reward members for political loyalty. However, the
236. Id. Accord Allied Indus. Workers Region 8, 265 N.L.R.B. 566, 567 (1982) (union
regional representatives' threats to file internal union charges against regional director for
the purpose of seeking his impeachment not protected by section 7 of the Act); Oregon
State Employees Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 976, 994-96 (1979) (union may reassign employee seek-
ing to replace union executive director with himself); Butcher's Local 115, 209 N.L.R.B. 806,
810-11 (1974) (union lawfully discharged appointed business agent who announced intent to
run against incumbent secretary-treasurer in next intra-union election). See also Retail
Store Employees Local 876, 212 N.L.R.B. 113, 115 (1974) (union may discharge employee
for remaining neutral by supporting neither party in intra-union election).
237. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 440-42 (1982). The Court explicitly reserved the
question "whether a different result might obtain in a case involving non-policymaking and
non-confidential employees." Id. at 441, n.11. Cf. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110
S.Ct. 2729, 2732 (1989) (political party affiliation may not be used as basis of promotion,
transfer, recall, and hiring decisions of non-policymaking, non-confidential public sector em-
ployees). For a discussion of the protection granted to elected union officials by the
LMRDA, see infra notes 276-278 and accompanying text.
238. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 441 (1982).
239. Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1989). The Court noted that
"[w]hile such patronage-related discharges had some chilling effect on the free speech rights
of the business agents, we found this concern outweighed by the need to vindicate the dem-
ocratic choice made by the union electorate." Id. at 355.
240. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 441 (1982).
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use of patronage is limited by the Board's regulation of selection
criteria for appointed positions other than job steward. The Board
has concluded that in order to achieve job efficiency, "a union may
consider loyalty in choosing individuals for policy-making, stew-
ard-type positions. ' 241 In Shenango Inc., a union removed a safety
committee chairman from his position for supporting an opposition
candidate in the international union's presidential election.2 2 In
finding the removal lawful, the Board reasoned that the union's
right to use political loyalty as a selection criterion arises from its
legitimate interest in filling its appointive offices with those who
can most effectively serve the union and the membership. "Reten-
tion of a plant safety committee chairman who is hostile to or in
disagreement with the leadership may be undesirable or ineffective
for a host of valid reasons." 43 The Board acknowledged that polit-
ical patronage can be used to retaliate against members who en-
gage in protected activities but held that "[tihe union is legiti-
mately entitled to hostility or displeasure toward dissidence in
such positions where teamwork, loyalty, and cooperation are neces-
sary to enable the union to administer the contract and carry out
its side of the relationship with the employer.
' 44
The steward appointment cases underscore the unions' right
to self-governance, while simultaneously implying that the Board
may have the authority to restrict its exercise. The Board's deci-
sions allow unions to consider political loyalty when filling an ap-
pointed position, if the fulfillment of the position's responsibilities
requires teamwork, loyalty and cooperation.2 45 However, under the
241. Toledo World Terminals, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 12, 130 L.R.R.M (BNA) 1503,
1508 (June 30, 1988).
242. Shenango Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1355 (1978).
243. Id. The Board did not explain the "host of valid reasons," or otherwise explain
why retention of a plant safety committee chair's disagreement with the local leadership
regarding the best choice for international union president would be "undesirable" or make
job performance "ineffective." The Board also did not cite record evidence supporting these
dire effects.
244. Id. Accord Local 282, Teamsters, 280 N.L.R.B. 733, 734 (1986), remanded sub
nom. Kudla v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1987); C-D Investment Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 632,
640-41 (1986) (removal of steward appointed by one political faction in union and replacing
that person with steward appointed by another, dominant political faction lawful). See also
Howland Hook Marine Terminal Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 453, 453-54 (1982) (employer violates
neither section 8(a)(3) nor 8(a)(5) when employer recognizes steward appointed by one fac-
tion and rejects steward appointed by another faction: appointment of steward is an inter-
nal union matter).
245. See Kudla v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 95, 100 n.1 (2d Cir. 1987) (need for political loyalty
is presumed for policy-making steward-type jobs as at least a selection criterion for placing
a steward on a job when a project first begins). But cf. Paintsmiths, Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d
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Shenango test a union may not consider political loyalty as a selec-
tion criterion for those appointed positions the Board finds do not
require "teamwork, loyalty and cooperation." The Board also can
prohibit a union from using political loyalty as a selection criterion
in a particular case, if it can be shown to have been applied arbi-
trarily.2" In short, the Board has not completely abstained from
regulating the processes by which unions select their appointed of-
ficers. Although the Board has granted the unions complete auton-
omy in establishing selection criteria for politically sensitive ap-
pointive union offices, it has impliedly reserved the authority to
regulate the criterion used to fill positions which do not require
political loyalty to union leadership.
Other than the steward appointment cases, and cases involv-
ing efforts by union employees to oust the incumbent union leader-
ship, 4 7 the NLRB has refused to distinguish between disciplinary
action that affects an officer's rights as a member (i.e., eligibility to
vote, attend union meetings, and run for office) and that which
only affects the officer as an officer (i.e., removal from office). For
example, a union may expel a member for filing a decertification
petition with the NLRB;248 so also, a union may remove and bar
from office an officer who files such a petition. 24 9 A union may not
expel a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB; 25 0 nor may a union remove a union officer, appointed2 5 1 or
1326, 1334 (8th Cir. 1980) (union must show necessity of replacement of a job steward with
another member that results in the loss of employment for the previous job steward).
246. See Kudla v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejected candidate for job
steward has right to information regarding how union has made previous appointments of
job stewards to determine "whether the loyalty standard was applied evenly or was merely a
pretext for preferential treatment of individuals favored by incumbent officials").
247. See supra notes 183-187, 203-206 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
249. See Machinists Lodge 66 (Smith-Lee Co.), 182 N.L.R.B. 849, 850 (1970). See also
Machinists Lodge No. 113 (American Hospital Supply Corp.), 207 N.L.R.B. 795, 798 (1973)
(same result with respect to union committeeman filing union security de-authorization pe-
tition); Printing Specialties & Paper Products Union 481, 183 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274 (1970)
(fine for filing representation petition for rival union unlawful, disqualification from holding
office lawful).
250. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Toledo World Terminals, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 12, 130 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1503, 1508 (unlawful for union to remove appointed dock steward from position for
disloyalty in filing unfair labor practice charge against union); National Post Office Mail
Handlers Local 308, 281 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1074 n.2 (1986) ("internal union considerations. .
cannot prevail in the face of the overriding public interest in unimpeded access to the Board
• . ."); Local 212, UAW, 257 N.L.R.B. 637, 637 (1981) (removal of chair of fair employment
practices committee for filing unfair labor practice charge against union unlawful even
1991]
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elected,252 for filing an unfair labor practice charge.
The Board's policy of denying the union constituency the right
to prevent its officers from filing Board charges, against either the
union or an employer, has generated considerable criticism. One of
the first to do so was NLRB Member Brown in his dissent in Meat
Cutters Local 590 .25 There, an elected job steward filed Board
charges that arose out of an intra-union dispute over the proper
policy for resolving a grievance against an employer. The union re-
moved the steward from his position but did not affect his mem-
bership rights. Finding no violation of the Act, Member Brown ar-
gued that the Board must look "through the charge to the
underlying nature of [the] dispute. '254 "All that is involved is a
disagreement between a shop steward and his superiors in the
Union on the handling of a grievance. '2 55 Stated differently, "it is
'plainly internal affairs of the union [that] are involved,' and there
is here no 'overriding public interest' in opening up Board
processes to resolve this purely internal Union matter. 2 5
Board Member Fanning protested against the same policy in a
case involving the discharge of two union employee-members for
protesting the union's business practices by filing a formal com-
plaint with the Department of Labor. In Carpenters Local 35, he
argued that as members of the union, those filing charges against
the union were entitled to the protection of their membership
rights.25 7 As employees, however, they had no greater right than
other employees to engage in conduct detrimental to their em-
though removal did not affect person's employment status or cause him to suffer any loss of
seniority, money, or union membership), enforced 690 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1982) (immate-
rial that removal does not affect employment status, seniority, etc.; it chills others who
might wish to file unfair labor practice charges against the union). But see NLRB v. Boiler-
makers, 581 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1978) (union may remove steward who failed to pursue
grievance through grievance procedure and instead filed unfair labor practice charge against
employer on behalf of grievant); General Am. Transp. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1977).
252. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Local 590, 181 N.L.R.B. 773, 776 (1970) (unlawful to re-
move elected union officer from position because officer filed unfair labor practice charge
against union); Longshoremen's Local 1367, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 916 (1964) (unlawful to place
local in trusteeship and remove elected officers for filing duty of fair representation charges
with NLRB).
253. Meat Cutters Local 590, 181 N.L.R.B. 773, 773 (1970).
254. Id. at 773 (Member Brown dissenting).
255. Id. (Member Brown dissenting).
256. Id. n.4 (Member Brown dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Work-
ers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1967)).
257. Carpenters Local 35, 264 N.L.R.B. 795 (1982), enforced, 739 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.
1984).
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ployer's business. The Act, he argued, does not protect "actions
whose target is [the union's] business practices .... ",258 A union's
right to manage its business must include the "right to manage its
own business affairs without interference from employees who are
also members.
259
The courts also have criticized the Board's approach. In
NLRB v. Boilermakers, an appointed union steward was removed
from his position for filing unfair labor practice charges against the
employer without first exhausting the contractual grievance proce-
dure as required by both the union contract and the union's senior
leadership.260 The Board ruled that his removal violated the Act.
The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's ruling, reason-
ing that "upon assuming union office, [the steward] undertook du-
ties also to carry out and further union policies and to help assure
its success as a collective bargaining agent."26 1 Concluding that its
credibility as a bargaining agent would be furthered by adherence
to contractual commitments, the union "could reasonably expect
its representatives' loyalty and support in pursuit of that policy.
[The steward's] discharge for defiance of the leadership reflected
the legitimate internal concerns of any functioning enterprise. "262
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was extremely critical of
the same policy when it reviewed an NLRB decision in which the
Board denied a union the right to remove an elected union officer
who had filed an unauthorized unfair labor practice charge in the
union's name. In International Association of Iron Workers, the
Board held that neither "alleged fraudulent misrepresentations nor
any other asserted internal union considerations raised by the
[union] can prevail in the face of 'the overriding public interest' in
'unimpeded access to the Board.' ,"26 The Board reasoned that
258. Id. at 799 (Member Fanning dissenting).
259. Id. at 799 n.23 (Member Fanning dissenting).
260. NLRB v. Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1978) (union may remove appointed
steward who failed to pursue grievance through grievance procedure and instead filed unfair
labor practice charge against employer on behalf of grievant), rev'g International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 227 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1977).
261. NLRB v. Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1978).
262. Id. The majority also cited LMRDA free speech cases upholding a union's right to
discipline officers for insubordination. Id. The dissent argued: 1) that any restraint on
Board access violates the Act, and 2) the LMRDA is distinguishable because it is designed
to protect free speech and the Taft-Hartley Act is designed to guarantee Board access. Id. at
479-81 (Vance, J., dissenting).
263. International Ass'n of Ironworkers, 277 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1072 (1985), supplemented,
279 N.L.R.B. 918 (1986), 285 N.L.R.B. 770 (1987), enforced, 864 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1989)
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"'any effort to equate the institutional interests of a union with
the statutory rights of employees is inappropriate.' ",264 This hold-
ing is quite remarkable when viewed in light of the Board's histori-
cal practice of balancing individual employee interests and union
institutional interests in union discipline cases.2 "
The court of appeals was incredulous:
We ... note that the Board's assertion that unions may not
regulate even wholly internal affairs, if such regulation in any
way interferes with Board access, blatantly contravenes the
well-established internal-union-affairs exception established
by Marine & Shipbuilding Workers. We cannot help but read
much of the original decision as a conscious attempt by the
Board to expand its jurisdiction and power in disregard of ob-
vious circumscribing authority.
2s
Apart from whether the Board's decision in Iron Workers was
mere power aggrandizement, it is unjustified for the Board to re-
fuse to accord unions sufficient autonomy to remove officers whose
insubordination harms the unions' legitimate interests. Outisde the
context of Board access cases, the NLRB has recognized that un-
ions have a legitimate interest in directing their officers and
preventing insubordination.2 6 Indeed, the Board permits unions to
(quoting NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1967)).
264. International Ass'n of Iron Workers, 277 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1072 n.3 (1985) (citing
Machinists Local 1414, 270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1334 (1984)) (emphasis in original). In a supple-
mental opinion the Board reaffirmed its original holding. Without abandoning its no-bal-
ance ideology, it argued in the alternative that even if some balancing is appropriate, unim-
peded Board access "is rarely outweighed by a union's institutional interests." 285 N.L.R.B.
770, 772 (1987).
265. See, e.g., supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
266. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 864 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1989). The court, neverthe-
less, enforced the Board's order, agreeing with the Board's supplemental decision, see supra
note 264, that, on balance, the union's institutional interests in this instance were insuffi-
cient to justify the officer's removal. Id. at 1232-35. The court noted: 1) that the record was
ambiguous regarding whether authorization was required as a condition of filing an unfair
labor practice in the union's name, 2) that the officer was disciplined before the union inves-
tigated whether the officer had received authorization to file the Board charge, 3) that the
removed officer was not a full-time paid employee of the union who would owe a higher duty
of loyalty than an unpaid elected officer, and 4) that removing the officer and fining him was
excessive-removal alone would be sufficient to vindicate the union's legitimate interest in
enforcing the officer's duty of loyalty as an officer. Id. at 1231-35.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's "plainly internal affairs of the union" excep-
tion to the prohibition against impeding Board access, see supra notes 72-73 and accompa-
nying text.
267. For example, as may any employer, a union may discipline an officer-employee for
dereliction of duty. See Retail Clerks Local 770, 208 N.L.R.B. 356 (1974). Unions also have
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remove officers who, in an official capacity and without authoriza-
tion, contact governmental agencies other than the NLRB.26" The
Board affords the unions this degree of autonomy even though it
generally takes the position that the Act prohibits any union ac-
tion that impedes access to governmental agencies.29
Certainly, if a legitimate union policy prohibits its agents from
filing unauthorized charges or complaints in the union's name,
there can be little justification for depriving the union of the right
to remove the insubordinate officer. The union has a legitimate in-
terest in choosing the causes with which it wishes to be associated.
Anyone may file a charge or complaint with agencies such as the
NLRB, the Department of Labor, or the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. Therefore, no overriding public interest is
frustrated by a union rule that prohibits its agents from misrepre-
the right to protect themselves from officer-employees' insubordination, even insubordina-
tion touching rights protected by section 7 of the Act. See Marine & Shipbuilding Workers,
277 N.L.R.B. 1548, 1567 (1986) (lawful to discipline local union executive secretary refusing
to join international in repudiating collective bargaining agreement which union had right to
repudiate); Industrial Workers Region 8, 265 N.L.R.B. 566 (1982) (appointed international
union employee interfered with internal affairs of locals to which he was not assigned and
contrary to union policy). See also NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 705, 630 F.2d 505, 508 (7th
Cir. 1980) (union privileged to discharge two appointed business agents who sought wage
increase by ignoring established procedures by raising wage complaints at stewards' meet-
ing, and potentially embarrassing union by distributing wage complaint leaflet at a luncheon
honoring the city's mayor: "[The] right to petition for wage increases must nonetheless be
balanced against the employer's right to expect a basic loyalty on the part of employees in
the performance of their assigned duties."), denying enforcement of, 244 N.L.R.B. 794
(1979).
There are, however, limits on the right to discipline officer-employees for insubordina-
tion. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 204, 246 N.L.R.B. 318 (1979) (union violated Act
by removing chief steward who provided NLRB affidavit without presence of union lawyer
contrary to instructions of union president: union has legitimate interest in requiring assis-
tance of counsel but removal of chief steward for advising member to file unfair labor prac-
tice against union alleging denial of fair representation arising out of grievance handling is
violation of the Act).
268. See Newspaper Guild Local 26, 265 N.L.R.B. 382, 400 (1982) (no violation of Act
for union to expel grievance committee chair for filing, in his official capacity and without
proper authorization, charges against employer with Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission where union had promulgated rule requiring such charges be filed with union's ap-
proval after consultation with legal counsel and where officer had reason to know that
charge would disrupt union's attempt to settle certain grievances).
269. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 35, 264 N.L.R.B. 795 (1982) (unlawful to discharge two
union employees for going to the Department of Labor to protest union election and finan-
cial irregularities), enforced, 739 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1984); Hotel Employees Local 28, 252
N.L.R.B. 1124 (1980) (unlawful reprisal against union business agent for filing charge with
state FEP commission to protest her own conditions of employment); Teamsters Local 528,
237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978) (unlawful to refuse to reappoint member as job steward because
member filed charges against union with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
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senting the union's association with a particular charge or com-
plaint. The public's interest would be better served by discourag-
ing union agents from misrepresenting the real parties in interest
to government agencies.
Sometimes it is necessary for a, union to have the ability to
remove a complaining officer even though the officer has filed a
charge or complaint with a government agency in his or her own
name. The Board should recognize several circumstances under
which removal of the complaining officer may be justified. First, as
the court reasoned in Boilermakers, a union should be able to re-
move an officer who files an unfair labor practice charge against an
employer, or files a charge against the employer with any other
government agency, when such a charge compromises the union's
credibility as a collective bargaining agent, or otherwise under-
mines the union's capacity to bargain effectively.270 The assump-
tion of union office brings with it a commitment "to carry out and
further union policies and to help assure its success as a collective
bargaining agent. 27 1 Accordingly, the union can "reasonably ex-
pect its representatives' loyalty and support in pursuit of [bargain-
ing policies]," 72 and, therefore, discharge those employees who fail
to meet such expectations.
Second, as the Supreme Court stated in Marine & Shipbuild-
ing Workers, when a union removes a union officer for filing a
Board charge against the union, removal may be justified only
when the "plainly internal affairs of the union" are involved.
27 1 If
the issue raised by an officer's filing an unfair labor practice charge
against the union involves a statutory policy that is not "far be-
yond internal union interests"274 and the union's internal appeal
process is sufficient to effect an adequate remedy, then there is no
"overriding" labor policy that justifies a prohibition of disci-
pline.78 Yet, the Board proceeds as if Marine & Shipbuilding
270. NLRB v. Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 260-262 and
accompanying text.
271. Id. at 477.
272. Id. It would not be remarkable for the Board to find conduct undermining the
union's bargaining status as unprotected by the Act for that principle underlies the doctrine
that wildcat strikes are unprotected by the Act. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); BARTosiC & HARTLEY, supra note 119 at 208-
10.
273. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
274. Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 688 (1981).
275. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Meat Cutters Local 590, 181 N.L.R.B.
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Workers contained no language limiting NLRB authority.
Finally, the NLRB should differentiate between the discipline
of appointed union officers and the discipline of elected union of-
ficers. The basis for this distinction arises from closely related
LMRDA precedent. In Finnegan, the Supreme Court ruled that
the LMRDA "does not restrict the freedom of an elected union
leader to choose [an appointed] staff whose views are compatible
with his own."'27 6 Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn distinguished the
Finnegan decision.2 Finnegan involved removal of an elected
union official who had protested a dues increase that senior union
officials supported. The Court held that such a removal violated
the free speech guarantees of the LMRDA by undermining its ba-
sic purpose, ensuring that union leaders remain responsive to their
membership. Removal of elected union officials deprives members
of the representative of their choice. It denies them their chosen
representative's leadership, knowledge, and advice, and it chills the
free speech of those who voted for the removed officer.27 8
The NLRB has argued that the implications of LMRDA need
not be considered in officer discipline cases.279 It might be appro-
priate to disregard Finnegan when a union, in the capacity of em-
ployer, is charged with violating employees' rights to self-organiza-
tion. An appointed union employee should enjoy the same Taft-
Hartley Act protections enjoyed by those who work for any other
employer.2so When, however, NLRB regulatory authority rests on
the Board's invocation of LMRDA labor policies, the Board should
not be able to pick which LMRDA policies it chooses to protect.
773 (1970), may have been such a case (as Member Brown argued in his dissent). See supra
notes 253-256 and accompanying text. There, a union removed a union steward for filing a
duty of fair representation unfair labor practice charge against the union. The dispute was
rooted in an internal union quarrel among officer groups regarding proper grievance han-
dling strategy. But cf. Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 688 (1981) (a duty of fair representa-
tion case "raises issues rooted in statutory policies extending far beyond internal union
interests").
276. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 441 (1982). See supra notes 237-240 and accompa-
nying text.
277. Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989).
278. Id. at 354-55.
279. See, e.g., NLRB v. Carpenters Local 35, 739 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1984) (NLRB cor-
rect that LMRDA protects member rights and is not a limit on Taft-Hartley Act restrictions
on union's actions against its employees as employees); NLRB v. Local 212, UAW, 690 F.2d
82 (6th Cir. 1982) (Finnegan limited to retaliation for election activities).
280. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text. See also Teamsters Local 420,
257 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1981) (union acting as employer violates section 8(a)(4) by discharging
employee who provided NLRB affidavit relating to Board charges filed against union).
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This is particularly important when the Board's authority to act
rests solely upon its protection of rights found in the LMRDA. 281
One example of this occurs when the Board acts to protect the
right of an appointed union officer (who is not an employee of the
union) to engage in internal union political activities. The Board's
ruling should not be premised upon its power to regulate the disci-
pline of officers whose appointed positions require cooperation and
loyalty.2 82 Rather, its rulings should be premised upon on whether
the position falls within the scope of Finnegan. Conversely, when a
union removes an elected union officer, who is not an employee of
the union, for engaging in internal union political activities, the
Board's regulatory authority is dependent on its power to protect
the national labor policies embedded in the LMRDA. Therefore,
the Board's decisions in such cases should be guided by Lynn,285
and a distinction should be made between the removal of an
elected officer and the removal of an appointed officer.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB continually claims noninterference in internal
union affairs and this claim has become too soothing a shibboleth
to be excised from its discourse. Nevertheless, it is important that
the NLRB and the public understand the myth of nonintervention.
Through control of union disciplinary processes, the Board regu-
lates important aspects of internal union governance-such as
member selection and direction of both appointed and elected
union representatives. The NLRB has a direct impact upon inter-
nal union affairs in many other ways as well. 84
Some may be neither surprised nor alarmed to discover a gov-
ernment agency hiding behind rhetorical cover.2 85 If the Board's
protestations of nonintervention shield or deflect its actions from
281. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Constr. Co.), 195 N.L.R.B. 1 (1972).
282. See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 7.
285. It could be argued that finding cover behind rhetorical boulders falls within a
grand tradition of American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court's standing doctrines provide
an example. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (three requirements for standing are direct
injury, traceability, and redressability); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("genera-
lized grievance" not sufficient to meet injury requirement of standing); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (taxpayer does not raise a "generalized grievance" if "there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated").
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scrutiny, an important check on the Board's authority is lost.
Much of the Board's rhetoric of nonintervention in internal union
affairs cannot survive scrutiny. The Board prohibits unions from
disciplining members for filing unfair labor practices without first
exhausting internal union remedies. These Board decisions read as
if the Supreme Court had never rejected the NLRB's assertion of
such broad regulatory authority in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuild-
ing Workers by limiting the Board's power to prohibit such disci-
pline where it could be shown that more than "plainly internal af-
fairs of the union [were] involved. '286 Moreover, the Board reads
much of the dicta in Scofield v. NLRB as if the Supreme Court
had never retreated from it in NLRB v. Boeing Co. and subsequent
cases. The implications of the post-Scofield cases need to be ac-
knowledged and integrated within the Board's approach to union
discipline cases.
The Board, in most opinions, draws no distinction between ex-
pulsion and other forms of union discipline. This violates the plain
language of the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), and ignores both the
legislative history of the section and Supreme Court precedent. By
regulating expulsion, the Board becomes the final arbiter of whom
the majority may exclude from governance. In the Board's cases,
the possible impact of this regulatory authority is neither discussed
nor even acknowledged.
A considerable amount of the Board's union discipline regula-
tion effectively denies unions the economic weapons necessary to
labor-management struggles. The Board has no authority to pur-
sue its own notions of balanced labor relations by supplementing
the statutory restrictions Congress placed on union activity. Re-
viewing courts must check the NLRB's continued usurpation of
regulatory authority.
The Board appropriately considers LMRDA policies in its
union discipline cases,.but does so selectively. Finnegan v. Leu and
Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn articulate foundation LMRDA poli-
cies, as does Steelworkers v. Sadlowski. Yet, in the Board's deci-
sions that rest solely on its authority to protect LMRDA policies,
it scrupulously avoids any reference to many of the fundamental
LMRDA principles contained in these cases. Instead, it focusses
narrowly on the LMRDA policies that support the Board's asser-
286. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968).
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tion of regulatory authority. Indeed, one would hardly know a rea-
sonable rules proviso exists in the LMRDA after reading the
Board's union officer insubordination cases. The Board proceeds as
if Finnegan and Lynn did not exist when it decides cases arising
out of union officer insubordination, protected by the free speech
guarantees of LMRDA. Yet these cases limit the Board's regula-
tory authority in all circumstances except those in which the union
is being charged as an employer. If the Board continues to premise
extension of its regulatory authority upon the protection of
LMRDA policies, it should consider all LMRDA policies, including
those that restrain the government, not just those that expand the
government's regulatory authority.
In short, many NLRB union discipline cases frustrate a basic
tenet of national labor policy. Governmental regulation should not
impinge upon the ability of unions to govern themselves, reduce
their effectiveness as collective bargaining agents, or by licensing
unions, destroy union independence. 87 Over fifty years have
passed since the Supreme Court chided the Board for attempting
to expand its authority by regulating internal union affairs through
administrative amendment of the Act.288 Nonetheless, the Board
continues to go its own way, its actions often escaping scrutiny be-
cause of excessive judicial deference. Only occasionally do the
Board's decisions generate rebuke for clearly ignoring the "inter-
nal-union-affairs" exception enunciated in Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers,289 and disregarding the limits of its jurisdiction. 290
In 1987, Justice Scalia's frustration with the Board's intransi-
gence was voiced in a ringing indictment of the Board's analytical
approach to section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act:
The Board's approach is the product of a familiar phenome-
non. Once having succeeded, by benefit of excessive judicial
deference, in expanding the scope of a statute beyond a rea-
sonable interpretation of its language, the emboldened agency
presses the rationale of that expansion to the limits of its
logic .... [Eventually,] there comes a point at which a later
287. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1959). See supra note 171 and accompa-
nying text.
288. Colgate Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
289. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 864 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1989).
290. Id. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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incremental step, again rational in itself, leads to a result so
far removed from the statute that obedience to text must
overcome fidelity to logic.
29 1
This criticism is equally applicable to the Board's interpretation of
section 8(b)(1)(A). The NLRB's section 8(b)(1)(A) union discipline
cases clearly represent an unwarranted divergence from the stat-
ute's plain language.
The concept of voluntary unionism was firmly established by
the decisions in Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB and Communi-
caton Workers v. Beck. Following that achievement, the next step
is a recommitment to the right of union members, who have volun-
tarily accepted the obligations of membership, to govern their own
institutions. Such an action would reconfirm this country's dedica-
tion to two of its basic national labor policies: respect for individ-
ual rights, and the collective right of the membership majority to
participate in self-governing unions free from government
regulation.
291. NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 597-98 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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